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INTRODUCTION

For more than a quarter century, the Supreme Court has repeat
edly declared that sex-based state action is subject to heightened scru
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause. But the Court has always
been much less clear about what that standard allows and what it pro
hibits. For this reason, it is especially noteworthy that one of the
Court's most recent sex discrimination opinions, United State s v.
Virg inia,' purports to provide more coherent guidance.
Virginia suggests that the constitutionality of sex-based state action
turns on whether the practice at issue denies women "full citizenship
stature" or "create[s) or perpetuate[s) the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women."2 Yet the opinion does not begin to indicate how
the sex discrimination jurisprudence might implement this new stan
dard. In particular, it does not tell us how to determine whether any
specific practice deprives women of "full citizenship" or maintains
their "inferiority."3
The answer to this question is far from obvious. Indeed, even the
large legal literature that has long argued that constitutional law en
forcing the Equal Protection Clause should be structured around a
commitment to combating "subordination" provides us with relatively
little guidance. This literature would seem to have concerns impor
tantly aligned to those that Virginia articulates. But it ultimately does
not teach us much about how to identify the practices that undermine
women's "full citizenship" or sustain their "inferiority. "4
This Article attempts to give some content to the framework that
Virginia presents. More specifically, it explores how analyzing the his
torical record of a practice can inform an investigation into whether,
when, and why that practice is consistent with women's "full citizen
ship stature" or operates to perpetuate their "legal, social, and eco
nomic inferiority. "5
History is not the only source that one could use in considering
how to give flesh to the standard that Virg inia suggests, and the social
understandings and distributive consequences associated with a prac
tice over time cannot conclusively establish how a practice is currently
functioning or should currently be regulated. But examining a practice
at some remove from the present can reveal hidden dimensions of a
problem and bring into sharper focus questions that are obscured in
contemporary debates. A historical record can direct a Court's atten1. 518 U.S. 515

(1996).

2.

Id. at 532, 534.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.
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tion toward particular issues, uncover areas of concern, and illuminate
factors that might be relevant. This Article takes the historical record
of sex-segregated public education in the United States as its case
study. That record is an especially apt place to begin because Virginia
directly concerned the constitutional status of a sex-segregated public
school.6
The Article proceeds in. two parts. The first examines heightened
scrutiny, "full citizenship stature," and "legal, social, and economic in
feriority" as they appear and function in the Court's sex discrimination
jurisprudence.7 The second considers how the historical record of sex
segregated public education might help us learn what we would need
to know in order to determine whether, when, and why the practice of
sex-segregated public education denies women "full citizenship stat
ure" or "create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic infe
riority of women."8
As we will discover, the record of sex-segregated public education
over time suggests that Virginia's "full citizenship" standard may ulti
mately challenge many of the assumptions on which the current sex
discrimination jurisprudence is based, including some endorsed in
Virginia itself.9 For example, Virginia, like the sex discrimination case
law before it, appears to treat the claims of different populations of
women as constitutionally interchangeable. But the historical record
of sex-segregated public education reveals that practices can deny "full
citizenship" to one set of women and not another, or can deprive dif
ferent groups of women of "full citizenship" in different ways.10 The
practice of sex-segregated public education, for instance, has histori
cally been entangled in both racial and class stratification, and has in
flicted injuries on women that varied depending on their racial and
economic status. This suggests that a decisionmaker regulating single
sex public schools under the framework Virginia outlines would be
well-advised to consider whether some or all of those schools have dif
ferent consequences for different groups of women.
Similarly, the current sex discrimination jurisprudence focuses on
separation as the mechanism through which inequality is maintained,
perhaps because this mechanism has featured so prominently in the
history of race discrimination in the United States. The sex discrimina
tion case law seems to assume, for example, that sex-segregated and
coeducational public education are wholly different practices, direct
ing constitutional scrutiny at the former while all but ignoring the pos6. See id. at 519.
7.

Id. at 532, 534.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 532.
10. Id.
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sibility that coeducational public schools might operate to undermine
women's equal citizenship.
Yet the historical record of sex-segregated (and coeducational)
public education makes clear that separation of the sexes is not the
only means by which practices can deprive women of "full citizenship"
and sustain their "inferiority."11 Some of the same mechanisms of infe 
riority can function in both sex-segregated and coeducational public
schools. Indeed, the historical record reveals that differences of form
like that between sex-segregated and coeducational public education
can actually prove relatively unimportant in terms of their substantive
impact on women's status. Through at least the first half of the twenti
eth century, for instance, sex-segregated public education was system
atically structured to steer and push women toward marriage and
motherhood and to discourage and disable them from pursuing
prominent participation in economic or political affairs. This fe ature
of the practice, which we might call "sex role confinement," did not
depend on separation, however. Role confinement was present in ap
proximately equal measure in the coeducational public schools of the
period.
This suggests that a Court considering whether all sex-segregated
public education should be constitutionally prohibited under Virginia's
framework-a question that the Court has yet to decide-could
usefully compare the practices of sex-segregated and coeducational
public education. Presumably, a Court would be unwilling to categori
cally ban coeducational public schooling. But if the practices of sex
segregated and coeducational public education tum out to be operat
ing with equal effect to maintain women's "legal, social, and economic
inferiority," it is hard to see why a jurisprudence committed to
women's "full citizenship" would want to emphasize form by abso
lutely prohibiting sex-segregated public schooling, or how transferring
all public school students to coeducational schools would advance
women's "full citizenship stature" and fight their "inferiority."12 Along
the same lines, this record also suggests that if sex-segregated public
education is not absolutely prohibited under Virginia's framework, a
Court determining what constitutional regulations would best prevent
single-sex public schools from undermining women's equal citizenship
should consider the potential problem of role confinement. Similarly,
a Court interested in protecting women's equal status would be wise to
focus much more constitutional scrutiny on coeducational public
schools directly, examining them also as possible sources of women's
inequality.

11.

Id. at 532, 534.

12. Id.
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Finally, the Virginia opinion appears to express a particular consti
tutional interest in w omen's "full citizenship stature" and "the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of w omen."13 But prior sex discrimina
tion cases, and parts of Virginia, treat men and women interchangea
bly. For instance, all of the Court's opinions on sex-segregated public
education are committed to the proposition that single-sex public
schools-whether they enroll male or female students-must conform
to separate but equal standards by not excluding a sex of students that
lacks access to equal public educational opportunities elsewhere in the
jurisdiction. The historical record of sex-segregated public education,
however, reveals that a practice that functions to deprive women of
"full citizenship" may not necessarily inflict the same harms on men.14
For example, women's exclusion from men's public schools, when
women did not have the same opportunities available elsewhere, has
often caused women to suffer serious dignitary and material harm. But
it is not at all clear that men's exclusion from women's public schools
(when they did not have same opportunities available elsewhere) has
historically operated to impinge upon the "full citizenship" of either
men or women.15 This suggests that separate but equal standards may
not always be needed to prevent sex-segregated public schools from
denying equal citizenship, although the Court may remain committed
to those standards as a required constitutional minimum for other rea
sons. More· generally, it suggests that a Court applying Virginia's
framework could usefully consider the possibility that a practice may
have a different effect and meaning for women and men.
Before we explore the potential uses of history in more detail,
however, let's begin by examining the current, uneasy state of the con
stitutional law of sex discrimination.
I.

HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY, "FULL CITIZENSHIP STATURE," AND
"LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC INFERIORITY"

A.

Th e Uncertain R each and R easoning of Heightened Scrutiny

In 1976, the Supreme Court determined that sex-based state action
would be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that it would be held
unconstitutional unless it served "important governmental objectives"
and was "substantially related to achievement of those objectives."16
This was an intermediate standard of constitutional review, deliber-

13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 532.
15. Id.
16. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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ately situated between rational basis analysis, which almost always up
holds the constitutionality of challenged actions, and strict scrutiny,
which almost always strikes practices down. How heightened scrutiny
would draw the line between constitutional and unconstitutional ac
tivity was, accordingly, a particularly pressing question from the start.
But over the course of more than a quarter century, the sex discrimi
nation jurisprudence has remained noticeably unclear on this issue.
The sex discrimination case law has established that its concern
centers narrowly on state action that explicitly distinguishes based on
sex. Facially neutral state action is subject to heightened scrutiny only
if the·plaintiff can prove the equivalent of legislative malice: "that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon" women or men.17 The Court, however, has offered much less
guidance as to which forms of explicit sex-based state action violate
equal protection.
One theme emphasized in the case law stresses that the constitu
tional claims of men and women are interchangeable. Consider, for in
stance, Craig v . B oren,18 the case that the Court selected for its an
nouncement that heightened scrutiny would apply to sex-based state
action. 19 Craig, the foundational case in the Court's constitutional ju
risprudence of sex discrimination, involved a male plaintiff rather than
a woman. It addressed, moreover, an issue of little, if any, relevance to
women's status in society: the right of young men to buy "'nonintoxi
cating' 3.2% beer" at the same age that young women could purchase
it.20
Another theme visible in the sex discrimination jurisprudence con
demns what the Court calls "invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereo
types about the relative abilities of men and women,"21 "fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females,"22 "archaic and
stereotypic notions,"23 or "'archaic and overbroad' generalizations."24
The concern here appears to be with legal practices that separate men
17. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
18. 429 U.S. at 190.
19. See id. at 197.
20. Id. at 191-92. For some additional examples of successful sex discrimination suits
that featured male plaintiffs, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720, 723 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143, 147 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381-82
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202-03
(1977) (plurality opinion).
21. J.E. B. , 511 U.S. at 1 31.
22. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
2 3. Id.
24. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 217 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
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and women based on beliefs about their respective abilities or prefer
ences that are inaccurate in the sense that they do not correctly de
scribe every man or every woman, although they may be true about
most (or almost all) men or women. By repeatedly characterizing such
practices as archaic-even when they accurately classify vast numbers
of present-day citizens-the Court's statements suggest that these
practices are completely at odds with the modem sex discrimination
jurisprudence and not to be tolerat�d. Drawing on this theme, the
Court has struck down a wide variety of sex-based legal classifications
under heightened scrutiny,25 with the exceptions generally tending to
cluster around sex-specific rules that the Court understands to be in
separably tied to the gestational capacity that all women (presump
tively) possess.26
25. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 ("[W]e are faced with the question whether the
Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender ['in the
exercise of peremptory challenges'] .... We hold that gender ... is an unconstitutional
proxy for juror competence and impartiality."); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456
(1981) ("[W)e consider the constitutionality of a now superseded Louisiana statute that gave
a husband, as 'head and master' of property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral right
to dispose of such property without his spouse's consent. (We) [c]onclud[e] that the provi·
sion violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...."); Wengler,
446 U.S. at 14446, 152 {"[Under § 287.240,] a widower is not entitled to death benefits un·
less he either is mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earning or proves actual de·
pendence on his wife's earnings. In contrast, a widow qualifies for death benefits without
having to prove actual dependence on her husband's earnings.... (W]e conclude that the
Supreme Court of Missouri erred in upholding the constitutional validity of § 287.240.");
Califano v.Westcott, 443 U.S.76, 78, 89 (1979) (" Section 407 of the Social Security Act ...
provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental sup·
port because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such benefits when
the mother becomes unemployed.... We conclude that the gender classification of §
407 .... cannot survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.");
Caban, 441 U.S.at 386·87, 394 ("[A]n unwed mother has the authority under New York law
to block the adoption of her child simply by withholding consent.The unwed father has no
similar control over the fate of his child, even when his parental relationship is substantial
as in this case. He may prevent the termination of his parental rights only by showing that
the best interests of the child would not permit the child's adoption by the petitioning cou·
pie.... We conclude that this undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and un·
wed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption of a child of theirs is at issue,
does not bear a substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests."); Orr, 440 U.S. at
270·71 ("The question presented is the constitutionality of Alabama alimony statutes which
provide that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce .... We
now hold the challenged Alabama statutes unconstitutional ...."); Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at
201-02 ( "Under the Federal Old·Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (OA SDI)
program, survivors' benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband covered by the
Act are payable to his widow. Such benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife
covered by the Act are payable to the widower, however, only if he 'was receiving at least
one-half of his support' from his deceased wife.... A three·judge District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that the different treatment of men and women man
dated by§ 402{f)(l)(D) constituted invidious discrimination against female wage earners by
affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to male employ
ees ....We affirm.") (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.248, 266-68 (1983) (upholding legislation that
"guarantees to certain people the right to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of
any adoption proceeding. The mother of an illegitimate child is always within that favored
class, but only certain putative fathers are included. "); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
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A third theme in the case law hinges on an analogy to race dis
crimination. This line of reasoning emerged early in the sex discrimi
nation jurisprudence, in Frontiero v. R ichardson (1973).27 Frontiero
was decided two years after the Supreme Court first struck down a
statute on the ground that it denied women the equal protection of the
laws,28 but before Craig held that heightened scrutiny would apply to
sex-based state action.29 The four-Justice plurality opinion in Frontiero
contended that sex-based state action should be subject to the same
strict scrutiny standard applied to race-based state action,30 and re
peatedly compared sex and race discrimination. It noted, for instance,
that "sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth."31 In drawing this analogy,
U.S. 464, 466, 472-73 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("[California's statutory rape law] makes
men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse. . .. We hold that such a statute
is sufficiently related to the State's objectives to pass constitutional muster. Because virtually
all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage preg
nancy f all on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to
punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. ");
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 348-49, 355 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("Under [Georgia
law], the mother of an illegitimate child can sue for the wrongful death of that child. . . . A
father who has not legitimated a child, however, is precluded from maintaining a wrongful
death action. . . . [T]he Georgia statute does not invidiously discriminate against the appel
lant simply because he is of the male sex. The fact is that mothers and fathers of illegitimate
children are not similarly situated. .. . Unlike the mother of an illegitimate child whose iden
tity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will frequently be unknown.").
For a prominent recent example of this mode of reasoning, see Tuan Anh Nguyen v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 58-60 (2001) ("We hold that§ 1409(a) is
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. .. . [, although it) imposes a
set of requirements on the children of citizen fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a
noncitizen mother that are not imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent is
the mother."); id. at 62 ("The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of
assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the rela
tion is verifiable from the birth itself .... In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is
that he need not be present at the birth."); id. at 64-65 ("The second important governmen
tal interest furthered in a substantial manner by§ 1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure
that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to
develop .. . the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen par
ent and, in turn, the United States. In the case of a citizen mother and a child born overseas,
the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the
very event of birth, an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understand
ings of citizenship. . . . The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a
matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father.") (citation omitted).
27. 411 U.S.677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
28. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
29. See Craig v.Boren, 429 U.S.190, 197 (1976).
30. See Frontiero, 411 U.S.at 682 ("[A)ppellants contend that classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect
and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. We agree ... ."); id. at 688 ("[W]e
can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race,
alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny.").
31. Id. at 686. Along the same lines, the Frontiero plurality explained that "what differ
entiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it
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the opinion never focused on the particular situation of women of
color. Instead, it used white women to represent all women, and then
compared white women to black men. For example, the opinion
analogized the history of (white) women and (male) African
Americans, briefly recounting that:
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our soci
ety was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre
Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve
on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women tradition
ally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve
as legal guardians of their own children.32

Ultimately, of course, the Court decided to apply intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny to sex-based state action, which suggested
that sex discrimination was not quite analogous to race discrimination
and of lesser constitutional concern for that reason. But the Court has
continued to employ the comparison between race and sex discrimina. tion as a prominent explanation for why sex discrimination merits spe
cial constitutional scrutiny, returning to this contention repeatedly in
the years since Craig.33
Against this background, one might expect the Court to have, for
instance, easily struck down all forms of sex-segregated public educa
tion under heightened scrutiny. Single-sex public schooling, after all,
explicitly distinguishes between students based on sex, and has no ob
vious connection to gestation or to any other fact about the body uni
versally true of all men or all women. What's more, the potential anal
ogy to race discrimination could not be clearer or more patently
available. In B rown v. B oard of Education (1954),34 the Supreme
Court famously held that racial segregation in public schools is always
unconstitutional, whether or not the excluded race has access to public
educational opportunities that are "separate but equal" in resources,
facilities, and other material advantages.35 Since B rown, racial segregawith the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society." Id.
32. Id. at 685.
33. See, e.g., J.E.B. v.Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.127, 136 (1994) ("As a plurality of
this Court observed in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 685: '[T]hroughout much of the
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that
of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes."'); id. ("Certainly, with respect to jury service,
African-Americans and women share a history of total exclusion, a history which came to an
end for women many years after the embarrassing chapter in our history came to an end for
African-Americans."); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) ( "With respect to
appellee's second contention [that 'conscientious objectors are a suspect class deserving spe
cial judicial protection'], we find the traditional indicia of suspectedness lacking in this case.
The class does not possess an 'immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth,' Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 686 ....")
.

34. 347 U.S.483 (1954).
35. See id. at 493-95.

764

M ich igan Law Review

[Vol. 101:755

tion in public education has become the Court's paradigm example of
unconstitutional race discrimination.36
Yet the constitutional law of sex-segregated public education actu
ally constitutes a striking example of the Court's continued uncer
tainty about which forms of sex-based state action are unconstitutional
under heightened scrutiny, and why. Although the Court has desegre
gated some single-sex public schools, it has always done so on the
ground that the particular school in question violated the require
ments of even a separate but equal regime, excluding students based
on sex when the students did not have access to equal public educa
tional opportunities elsewhere in the jurisdiction. The Court, more
over, has explicitly avoided making any judgments about the constitu
tionality of sex-segregated public education under conditions of
material parity, strongly suggesting that it believes that this form of
sex-based state action presents a difficult constitutional question. At
the same time, the Court has been unable to explain the source of that
intuition.37
Consider the first two of the Supreme Court's three cases on sex
segregated public education under heightened scrutiny.38 In the first
36. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) ("Just as the State may not, ab
sent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its . . . schools,
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), so did we recognize in Shaw that it may
not separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race."); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that
black students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court re
jected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I )." ); Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) ("An unbroken line of cases following Brown v.
Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimination in
education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individu
als.").
37. For this reason, I do not find Mary Anne Case's recent argument about the current
state of the sex discrimination jurisprudence to be fully persuasive. On her account, the
Court's sex discrimination case law is governed by a clear, established, and unwavering prin
ciple: The Court will only uphold sex-based state action where "the assumption at the root of
the sex�respecting rule [is) true of either all women or no women or all men or no men; there
must be a zero or a hundred on one side of the sex equation or the other." Mary Anne Case,
"The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest
for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449-50 (2000); see also id. at 1457 ("Descrip
tively, while I do not claim that the perfect proxies the Court found are good ones, I do claim
(1) that the majority found a perfect proxy in every sex-respecting rule the Court upheld
since Frontiero, and (2) for every sex-respecting rule struck down since Frontiero, no perfect
proxy, even a farfetched one, occurred to the court, or to me."). It is not at all obvious that
the constitutional law of sex-segregated public education can be characterized in these
terms, however. As mentioned above, sex-segregated schooling seems to have no apparent
connection to gestation or to facts about the body that are universally true of all men or all
women. According to Case's account of the sex discrimination jurisprudence, it should have
been easy for the Court to categorically prohibit all forms of sex-segregated public education
(with the possible exception of something like sex-segregated public education geared to
pregnant students). Yet the Court does not seem to agree that sex-segregated public educa
tion presents an easy case under heightened scrutiny.
38. Before the Supreme Court established heightened scrutiny for sex-based state ac
tion, or struck down any statute on the ground that it represented unconstitutional sex dis-
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case, Vorchheimer v. Sch ool D is trict (1977),39 Susan Lynn
Vorchheimer challenged the exclusion of female students from
Central High School, an academically elite and selective public high
school for boys in Philadelphia.40 By the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, a district court had found;41 and an· appeals court had
agreed,42 that the educational opportunities available to male students
at Central High were "comparable" to those available to female
students at the Philadelphia High School for Girls, the only other
academically elite and selective public high school in Philadelphia.43
The Supreme Court chose Vorchheimer for its first consideration of
sex-segregated public education under heightened scrutiny, but could
not decide the case. The Court split four-to-four in Vorchheimer,
without issuing any opinions.44 The Third Circuit's judgment, which
had upheld women's exclusion from Central High,45 was just affirmed
crimination, the Court summarily affirmed a district court judgment upholding the exclusion
of men from Winthrop College under rational basis review. See Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S.
951, 951 (1971) (mem.), affg 316 F. Supp. 134, 135-38 (D. S.C. 1970).
39. 430 U. S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
40. See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 880-81 (3d Cir. 1976).
41. See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 327, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
42. See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 882 ( "The courses offered by the two schools are simi
lar and of equal quality. The academic facilities are comparable, with the exception of those
in the scientific field where Central's are superior. The district court concluded 'that (gener
ally] the education available to the female students at Girls is comparable to that available to
the male students at Central."'); id. ("A fair summary of the parties' positions, therefore, is
that: ... the schools for boys and girls are comparable in quality, academic standing, and
prestige . .. . ").
43. In truth, this factual conclusion was highly suspect, grounded in a casual and cursory
interpretation of separate but equal principles. As its very name implies, Central High
School, the first public high school in Philadelphia and one of the earliest public high schools
in the United States, see Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 328; infra text ,accompanying notes
100-102, was at the pinnacle of Philadelphia's educational system in a way that the High
School for Girls was not. The district court's own opinion in Vorchheimer suggested that
Central High had more programs, more facilities, more qualified teachers, more books, more
financial support, more prestige, and more prominent alumni than its female counterpart.
See Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 328-29; see also Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. &
C.3d 682, 685-92, 696-99, 703-04 (C.P. Phila. County 1983) (elaborating on these disparities),
appeal from final adjudication quashed, 478 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); FRANK LIN
SPENCER EDMONDS, HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL OF PHILADELPHIA 83
(1902) (providing a book-length account of the resources and illustrious history of Central
High School that describes, for example, Central High's observatory, "the fourth oldest in
America ").
,

·

44. See Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703. "MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case, " leaving only eight Justices remaining. Id.

45. See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 881, 886. Female students would not gain access to
Central High School until they went to Pennsylvania state court in 1983. In this second suit,
the plaintiffs again argued that the High School for Girls failed to offer women equivalent
educational opportunities. See Newberg, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 683-84. In this case, however,
the court conducted a much more rigorous separate but ·equal analysis and desegregated
Central High, holding that Vorchheimer's counsel had provided such materially inadequate
representation in developing the facts of the case that the plaintiffs in the state suit could not
be bound by the earlier factual findings. See id. at 702-07, 711-12.
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automatically on the basis of the divided vote.46
The Court's second case on sex-segregated public education under
heightened scrutiny, M ississ ippi Univers ity for Women v. Hoga n
(1982),47 also left the constitutional status of '"separate but equal"'
sex-segregated public education unresolved, explicitly reserving judg
ment on that question.48 The Hoga n Court ordered the School of
Nursing in the Mississippi University for Women to admit men simply
on the ground tQat the men excluded from the school did not have ac
cess elsewhere in Mississippi to the public educational opportunities
available to women.49
Vorchheirner and Hogan appear to reflect the Court's belief that
sex-segregated public education raises complex constitutional ques
tions. But the Court was unable in either case to offer an adequate ex
planation of the reasoning behind that assessment.
One line of thought visible in the cases drew on a particular vision
of the history of sex-segregated public education, which incorrectly
imagined the record of this practice to be wholly benign, uncontested,
structured for the mutual benefit of men and women, and not worth
further investigation.50 This theory featured prominently in the Third
46. See Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703.
47. 458 U.S. 71 8 (1982).
48. Id. at 720 n.1 ("Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or college.
Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can provide 'separate but equal'
undergraduate institutions for males and females. Cf. Vorchheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (CA3 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703
(1977)."). In his dissent in Hogan, Justice Blackmun indicated that he would uphold the con
stitutionality of sex-segregated public education that was "'separate but equal."' Id. at 734
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority opinion in Hogan "places in con
stitutional jeopardy any state-supported educational institution that confines its student
body in any area to members of one sex, even though the State elsewhere provides an
equivalent program to the complaining applicant").
.49. The opinion did not elaborate much on what "'separate but equal'" standards re
quired, but it explained that those principles were violated in this case because Mississippi
operated no all-male nursing school and its coeducational nursing programs were located "a
considerable distance from" the male plaintiff's home. Id. at 720 & n.l, 723 & n.8. The Court
limited its opinion to the School of Nursing in particular, without addressing the admissions
policies for the rest of the Mississippi University for Women. See id. at 723 n.7.
50. The impulse to assert that women have consensually agreed to the status they oc
cupy is deeply rooted in American law and society and appears in a wide variety of contexts.
For example, I recently explored contemporary debates over the legal status of marital rape.
People on both sides of these debates consistently assume that the law's protection of mari
tal rape did not become controversial until the late twentieth century. Although the histori
cal record clearly contradicts that notion, its prevalence reflects and draws strength from a
common presumption holding that long-established aspects of women's legal status must
have survived into the contemporary era because they embody a set of shared norms, long
endorsed by women and men alike. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. Rev. 1373, 1375-85, 1485-90, 1498-1505 (2000); see also
id. at 1382-85 (arguing that this presumption also shapes many historical accounts of the first
woman's rights movement). For work exploring related assumptions about women's consent,
see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial interpretations of Sex
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Circuit's opinion in Vorch heimer,51 and was also endorsed by Justice
Powell's dissent in Hogan. Powell asserted that sex-segregated public
education could be constitutional in some contexts because it was not
the product of "any discriminatory animus."52 He presented no histori
cal evidence to undergird this conclusion, but drew on some deeper
certainty to report that "[t]he sexual segregation of students has been
a reflection of, rather than an imposition upon, the preference of those
subject to the policy."53 With this consensual view of the history of sex
segregated public education in mind, moreover, Powell also found it
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest A rgument, 103
HAR V. L. REV. 1749, 1770, 1777 (1990) ("In theD early race discrimination cases, the courts

applied evidentiary standards that presumed that continuing patterns of racial segregation
were attributable to historical labor market discrimination, rather than to minorities' inde
pendent preferences for lower-paying, less-challenging jobs. . . . [In contrast,] almost half the
courts considering the issue have attributed sex segregation to women's own work prefer
ences."); Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning

About "the Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY,
MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131, 1 3 3 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999) ( "This

essay argues that the prevailing understanding of the suffrage amendment reflects habits of
reasoning about gender relations that it in turn helps sustain. At the level of common sense,
we do not understand gender relations to have a political history in anything like the way we
understand race relations to have a political history: the narrative structures through which
we explain the relations of the sexes depict gender arrangements as the product of consensus
and custom rather than coercion and conflict. Our understanding of the Nineteenth
Amendment both reflects and sustains these habits of reasoning.").
51. The Third Circuit in Vorchheimer emphasized that sex-segregated public education
was not rooted in discrimination against women and girls. "If there are benefits or detri
ments inherent in the system, " the court explained, "they fall on both sexes in equal meas
ure." Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1976). Although it was unclear
where the court's certainty came from, it appeared to be based on this sort of picture of the
past.
On the Third Circuit's account, all-male public schools like Central High had established
their exclusionary admissions policies out of innocuous pedagogical motives that were de
signed to operate to the shared advantage of boys and girls. "[T]he special emotional prob
lems of the adolescent years are matters of human experience and have led some educa
tional experts to opt f or one-sex high schools, " the court recounted. "While this policy has
limited acceptance on its merits, it does have its basis in a theory of equal benefit and not
discriminatory denial." Id. at 887 ; see also id. at 888 ("[G]iven the objective of a quality edu
cation and a controverted, but respected theory that adolescents may study more effectively
in single-sex schools, the policy of the school board here does bear a substantial relation
ship."). This was more a conclusory statement about the history of "the time honored educa
tional alternative of sexually-segregated high schools, " id. at 882, than an actual account of
that history. The Third Circuit, for example, offered no explanation for why Central High
was established exclusively for boys, long before Philadelphia's girls had any opportunity to
obtain a public high school education, nor did it discuss who had made that judgment. But
the Third Circuit appeared to rely on its vision of history, nonetheless, in holding that consti
tutional courts had no responsibility to end women's exclusion from male public schools, as
long as equivalent public educational opportunities were available elsewhere in the jurisdic
tion.
52. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 737 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 737 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting) ( "[T]he
practice of voluntarily chosen single-sex education is an honored tradition in our coun
try . . . . Mississippi's accommodation of such student choices is legitimate because it is com
pletely consensual and is important because it permits students to decide for themselves the
type of college education they think will benefit them most.").
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easy to dismiss any comparisons with racially segregated public educa
tion, which he took to have a malevolent and coercive past. Sex
segregated public education, Powell explained, had historically oper
ated to expand women's choices. It therefore "differ[ed] from the tra
dition, typified by the decision in Plessy v . Ferguson, of 'separate but
equal' ra cial segregation" because " [i]t was characteristic of racial seg
regation that segregated facilities were offered, not as alternatives to
increase the choices available to blacks, but as the s ole altemative."54
The Hogan majority endorsed a different argument. This line of
reasoning stressed that the history of sex-segregated public education
was of no constitutional relevance at all. It offered, however, no alter
nate explanation for the Court's instinct that sex-segregated public
education could be constitutional.
Mississippi's "primary justification" in Hogan for excluding men
from the School of Nursing was "that it compensate[d] for discrimina
tion against women."55 In support of this contention, Mississippi ex
plained that the Mississippi University for Women had been founded
in 1884 "to provide some form of higher education for the academi
cally disenfranchised," because the University of Mississippi banned
female students before 1882, and then alternately prohibited and dis
couraged the admission of (white) women until after 1920.56 The
Hogan Court accepted this historical account, which suggested that
the practice of sex-segregated public education might be historically
entangled in the law's denial of equal status to women. But the Hogan
majority simultaneously made clear that it did not matter whether a
school's admissions policy had been part of the history of women's le
galized inequality, or a response and counterweight to it, or both.57 On
the Court's view, Mississippi's only hope for establishing a record of
discrimination that might affect the constitutionality of the School of
Nursing's admissions policy would require the state to demonstrate
that discrimination currently deprived women of adequate opportuni
ties to obtain nursing training and to prove that the state intended for

Id. at 741 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun's dissent in
also rejected, without explanation, the analogy between educational segregation
based on race and educational segregation based on sex. See id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dis
senting) ("I hope that we do not lose all values that some think are worthwhile (and are not
based on differences of race or religion) and relegate ourselves to needless conformity.")
(emphasis added).
54.

Hogan

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 727 n.13.

at 727.

57. For more discussion of the founding of the Mississippi University for Women, origi
nally the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the
State of Mississippi in the Arts and Sciences, see infra text accompanying notes 113, 125-127,
168-169.
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the single-sex admissions policy at the School of Nursing to compen
sate for that current practice of discrimination.58
Of course, Hogan's rejection of the constitutional relevance of his
tory could not affirmatively account for its impulse to protect certain
forms of sex-segregated public education. The Hogan Court made
space for the possibility of "'separate but equal"' sex segregation, even
though this was an example of the very sort of explicit sex-based clas
sification that the law of heightened scrutiny otherwise targeted.59 In
deed, it left room for more than that. In rejecting Mississippi's argu
ment from history, the Hogan Court at least implied that even
asymmetrical sex segregation in public schooling might be constitu
tionally permissible if it responded to current (rather than past) ineq
uities, a position that would place the law of sex-segregated public
education in even starker contrast to the constitutional jurisprudence
on racially segregated public schools.60 Yet the Court was never able
to explain its intuition that sex segregation in public education could
be constitutional.
B.

"Full Citizenship Stature" and "Legal, Social, and Economic
Inferiority"

In light of the Court's persistent uncertainty about the reach and
reasoning of heightened scrutiny, it is worth noting that one of the
Court's newest sex discrimination opinions purports to offer a more
cogent framework. In United States v. Virginia (1996),61 the Court's
most recent decision on sex-segregated public education, the United
States challenged the constitutionality of women's exclusion from the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a public college organized "to pro
duce 'citizen-soldiers,' men prepared for leadership in civilian life and
in military service."62 When this suit was initially filed, no public school
in Virginia offered women training as "'citizen-soldiers."'63 But
Virginia soon opened a Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL) in an effort to protect VMI's male-only admissions policy
58.

See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30 & n.16.

59.

Id. at 720 n.1.

60. See id. at 728 ("In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one
sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of ·the sex that is dispro
portionately burdened."). A similar suggestion appeared in Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
See id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's holding today is limited to the con
text of a professional nursing school. Since the Court's opinion relies heavily on its finding
that women have traditionally dominated the nursing profession, it suggests that a State
might well be justified in maintaining, for example, the option of an all-women's business
school or liberal arts program.") (citations omitted).
61. 518 U.S. 515 {19%).
62.

Id. at 519-20.

63.

Id. at 520.
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from legal intervention.64 In many respects, the Supreme Court's re
sponse to this case was very traditional. The Court easily determined
that Virginia's sex-segregated educational system, even with VWIL
included, did not satisfy separate but equal standards. VMI had more
prestige than VWIL,65 more resources,66 more course offerings,67 more
qualified teachers,68 more influential and loyal alumni,69 and a unique
method of training students,70 and its exclusion of women was uncon
stitutional for that reason.71 As the Virginia Court observed, there
were women qualified in all but sex to attend VMl,72 and when the
64.

See id. at 525-26.

65. See id. at 557 ("VMJ, too, offers an educational opportunity no other Virginia
·
institution provides, and the school's 'prestige'-associated with its success in developing
'citizen-soldiers'-is unequaled.").
66. See id. at 520 ("VMl's endowment reflects the loyalty of its graduates; VMI has the
largest per-student endowment of all public undergraduate institutions in the Nation.").

67. See id. at 557 ("Virginia has closed this facility to its daughters and, instead, has de
vised for them a 'parallel program,' with a faculty less impressively credentialed and less well
paid, more limited course offerings, fewer opportunities for military training and for scien
tific specialization.").
68. See id.
69. See id. at 520 ("VMJ has notably succeeded in its mission to produce leaders; among
its alumni are military generals, Members of Congress, and business executives. The school's
alumni overwhelmingly perceive that their VMI training helped them to realize their per
sonal goals.").
70. See id. ("VMI's distinctive mission is to produce 'citizen-soldiers,' men prepared for
leadership in civilian life and in military service. VMJ pursues this mission through pervasive
training of a kind not available anywhere else in Virginia.").
71. See id. at 5 1 9 ("The United States maintains that the Constitution's equal protection
guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educational op
portunities VMI affords. We agree."); id. at 534 ("Because the remedy proffered by
Virginia-the Mary Baldwin VWIL program-does not cure the constitutional violation, i.e.,
it does not provide equal opportunity, we reverse the Fourth Circuit's final j udgment in this
case."); id. at 557 {"VMI, beyond question, 'possesses to a far greater degree' than the
VWIL program 'those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a . . . school,' including 'position and influence of the alumni, standing
in the community, traditions and prestige.' Women seeking and fit for a VMI-quality educa
tion cannot be offered anything less, under the Commonwealth's obligation to afford them
genuinely equal protection.'' (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 {1950))).
72. See, e.g., id. at 525 ("The parties agreed that 'some women can meet the physical
standards now imposed on men,' and the court was satisfied that 'neither the goal of pro
ducing citizen soldiers nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to
women.'" (quoting 976 F.2d at 896, 899)); id. at 540 ("It is also undisputed . . . that 'the VMI
methodology could be used to educate women.' The District Court even allowed that some
women may prefer it to the methodology a women's college might pursue.'' (quoting 852 F.
Supp. at 481)); id. at 540-41 ("'[S)ome women, at least, would want to attend [VMI) if they
had the opportunity,' the District Court recognized, and 'some women,' the expert testimony
established, 'are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets."' (quoting
766 F. Supp. at 1414, 1412)) {alterations in original); id. at 542 ("The issue . . . is not whether
'women-or men-should be forced to attend VMI'; rather, the question is whether the
Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the
training and attendant opportunities that VMJ uniquely affords." (quoting 52 F.3d at 93));
id. at 550 ("[G]eneralizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate
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school excluded them they did not have access to equivalent public
educational opportunities elsewhere in the state.73 Like Hoga n before
it, Virginia explicitly reserved judgment on whether separate but equal
sex segregation could be constitutional.74
At the same time, however, the Virginia Court also appeared to
suggest a new basis for determining which forms of sex-based state ac
tion represent unconstitutional sex discrimination and why.75 Most of

for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity
place them outside the average description.").
73. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
74. As the Court explained:
We address specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals as "unique," an opportunity available only at Virginia's
premier military institute, the Commonwealth's sole single-sex public university or college.
Cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720, n. 1 (1982) ("Mississippi main
tains no other single-sex public university or college. Thus, we are not faced with the ques
tion of whether States can provide 'separate but equal' undergraduate institutions for males
and females.").
·

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 (citations omitted). Rehnquist's concurrence, in turn, indicated
that he would uphold the constitutionality of sex-segregated public education where the
state operated a single-sex school for each sex, rather than just one, and "the two institutions
offered the same quality of education and were of the same overall caliber." ld. at 565
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
75. Thus far, the Court's opinion in Virginia has attracted critical attention mainly for
what it might indicate about the level of constitutional scrutiny appropriately applied to sex
based state action. In some passages of the Virginia opinion, the Court explained that ex
plicit legal classifications based on sex can only survive constitutional challenge if they have
"an 'exceedingly persuasive justification."' ld. at .531; see also id. at 532-34. A number of
scholars have read these statements to mean that the Court will now apply a more skeptical
form of review to sex-based legal classifications, and this contention has been a central focus
of scholarly debate over the opinion. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer,
VMI, and the Art of Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361, 369 (1997) ("[Justice
Ginsburg writing for the Court in Virginia] certainly meant to push the Court as far as she
could in the direction of strict scrutiny. I am less inclined to believe that the rest of the six
concurring Justices are fellow travelers in this particular hermeneutical journey. But that
may not matter-the intermediate courts may take the hint and make it increasingly impos
sible for the high court to contain the language of the opinion."); Deborah L. Brake, Reflec
tions on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 35, 36 (1997) ("While the Court
stopped short of explicitly adopting strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications, the opinion
includes a number of indicators suggesting that the standard applied in VMI is essentially as
rigorous as today's strict scrutiny standard. Indeed, the analysis the Court applied to strike
down VMI's exclusion of women is all but indistinguishable from strict scrutiny."); Jon
Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins But Race Loses in
America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153, 214 (1999) ("In VMI, however, the Court invented a
new test for gender classifications that closely resembles the strict scrutiny test of race.");
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection
Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title Vll, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845,
883 (1997) ("[B]y requiring VMI to make institutional adjustments to admit qualified
women, the Court has elevated equal protection analysis to the level of the least-restrictive
means analysis of strict scrutiny."); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73 (1996) ("Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny and brings it closer
to the 'strict scrutiny' that is applied to discrimination on the basis of race."); id. at 75
("[T]he Court did not merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer to ·
strict scrutiny. After United States v. Virginia, it is not simple to describe the appropriate
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the Court's prior sex discrimination cases had assumed that women
have no history of constitutional relevance. Indeed, the brief mention
of women's past that appeared in the Frontiero plurality opinion-a
sketch meant simply to establish a connection between sex and race
constitutes the most lengthy account of women's legal history ever in
cluded in a Supreme Court sex discrimination opinion before
Virg inia.76 Portions of the Virginia opinion, though, ground the consti
tutional jurisprudence of sex discrimination in the history of women's
unequal status under the law.77 More specifically, they suggest that
constitutional law has a responsibility to work toward the establish
ment of women's equal citizenship and the eradication of women's le
galized inferiority precisely because women's unequal status is some
thing that the law itself has long helped to create, maintain, and
enforce.
In this vision, the sex discrimination jurisprudence has commit
ments that are broad and substantive. It is intended to give women
"full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, partici
pate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities,"78 by striving to end women's "legal, social, and economic
inferiority."79 As the Virginia Court explained:
In 1971, for the. first time in our Nation's history, this Court ruled in
favor of a woman who complained that her State had denied her the

equal protection of its laws. Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly recog
nized that neither fe deral nor state government acts compatibly with the
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women,
simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportu

nity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on
their individual talents and capacities.

standard of review. States must satisfy a standard somewhere between intermediate and
strict scrutiny.").
For the contrary argument, see Case, supra note 37, at 1448 ("This Article will demon
strate that Justice Scalia is quite right in his articulation of the standard applied by the ma
jority in VMI, but wrong to assert that it is a departure of any kind from precedent.").
76. See supra text accompanying note 32.
77. The opinion explains that:
Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex re
sponds to volumes of history. As a plurality of this Court acknowledged a generation ago,
"our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination." Through a cen
tury plus three decades and more of that history, women did not count among voters com
posing "We the People"; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the fran
chise. And for a half century thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government,
both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as
any "basis in reason" could be conceived for the discrimination.

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973)).
78. Id. at 532.
79. Id. at 534.

December 2002]

Women's "Full Citiz ens hip"

773

"Inherent differences" between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's op
portunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered," to "promot[e]
equal employment opportunity," to advance full development of the tal
ent and capacities of our Nation's people. But such classifications may
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social,
and economic inferiority of women.80

Building on this theme, the Virginia Court went on to at least sug
gest that the constitutionality of single-sex public schooling might tum,
not just on whether the regime satisfied separate but equal require
ments, but on whether the school in question contributed to women's
unequal status or not. "Several amici," the Court reported,
have urged that diversity in educational opportunities is an altogether
appropriate governmental pursuit and that single-sex schools can con
tribute importantly to such diversity. Indeed, it is the mission of some
single-sex schools "to dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gen
der classifications." We do not question the Commonwealth's preroga
tive evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities.81

This line of reasoning represents a substantially new idea within
the constitutional jurisprudence of sex discrimination, one that the
Court seems to believe can offer an effective way to determine which
forms of state action fail heightened scrutiny and a normative justifica
tion for why. But the Court does not begin to tell us how we might
take seriously the suggestions that Virginia puts forth. If the constitu
tional law of sex discrimination is to strike down those forms of sex
based state action that "create or perpetuate the legal, social, and eco
nomic inferiority of women,"82 how do we tell which ones they are?
80. Id. at 532-34 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Denise Morgan has also
noted this theme in the Virginia opinion, but she contends that it has been consistently ex
pressed in the Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence since Frontiero. See Denise
C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v Virginia: Evaluating the Con
stitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 383 ("Since the
Supreme Court decided Frontiero v Richardson in 1973, constitutional scrutiny of [sex
based] classifications has turned on two considerations: 'fit'-whether the challenged prac
tice actually serves the objective the legislature intended it to serve; and 'anti
subordination'-whether the legislative objective is to disadvantage, and sometimes,
whether the challenged practice has subordinating effects."). In my view, however, this line
of reasoning in Virginia represents much more of a new development. Virginia suggests that
the law's historical role in maintaining women's unequal status provides the normative justi
fication for a doctrine of heightened scrutiny that is grounded in a determination to protect
women's equal citizenship and combat their inferiority. In contrast, the Court's prior sex dis
crimination jurisprudence is pointedly indifferent to women's particular history of legalized
inferiority and, frequently, to substantive issues of equality more generally. See supra text
accompanying notes 18-20.
81. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 (quoting Brief for Twenty-six Private Women's Colleges
as Amici Curiae 5).
82. Id. at 534.
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How would we go about determining what sustains such inferiority
and what promotes women's "full citizenship stature,"83 in the context
of sex-segregated public education or elsewhere? What would we need
to know to decide the next case, if we were to follow Virginia's injunc
tion?
The answers to these questions are hardly obvious. To take the
practice most immediately at hand again, there is certainly room for
active debate about whether, when, why, and how sex-segregated
public education contributes to women's inequality.84 Indeed, even the
large and expanding body of legal literature written in what might be
called the "anti-subordination tradition" does relatively little to help
us apply Virginia's suggested legal standard to specific situations. The
writers in this tradition would not necessarily agree with the Virginia
Court on all counts. But the anti-subordination literature, which has
argued for more than three decades that constitutional law enforcing
the equal protection guarantee should focus on eradicating subordina
tion, would still seem to have concerns substantially aligned to those
that the Virginia opinion articulates. Yet this literature ultimately
proves frustrating as a guide to determining which practices deny
women "full citizenship stature" or sustain their "legal, social, and
economic inferiority. "85
The anti-subordination literature has developed a variety of differ
ent accounts of how practices, institutions, and activities can operate
to maintain subordination in the United States, and named a variety of
harms that subordination can inflict on the members of targeted
classes. But although it is generally not remarked upon,86 this litera-

83. Id. at 532.
84. For some examples of the wide range of opinion that presently exists on this subject,
see 140 CONG. REC. 26,910 (1994) (statement of Rep. Mink) ("[O)nce you begin segregating
students by sex, it is the girls that always lose. It was not too many years ago, when girls con
tinued to be forced to take home-making while boys took technical training classes which
gave them skills they could easily translate into the marketplace . . . . [T]he path of separate
but equal . . . has never proved to benefit minorities, girls or any other group that has been
historically discriminated against in our schools system."); Susan Estrich, For Girls' Schools
and Women 's Colleges, Separate ls Better, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 38,
39 ("Instead of declaring equality, society should be advancing it. . . . One place that happens
is in girls' schools and women's colleges. Sometimes separate isn't equal; it's better. Chang
ing the way teachers teach in coed schools, changing the textbooks to make sure they talk
about women as well as men, educating parents about raising daughters-all of these things
make sense, since most girls will be educated in coed classrooms. But we've· been talking
about them for a decade, and the problems of gender bias stubbornly persist.").
85. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534.
86. For an exception, see KENNETH L. KARST, B ELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 237 (1989) ("Identifying equal citizenship as the sub
stantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment does not decide concrete cases. There is as
much room for the begging of questions here as in any other general formulation of princi
ple, and no principle of equality can escape the problem of open-endedness. . . . 'It merely
states the problem,' I heard Judge Hand say on an evening long ago, speaking of his own
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ture has been able to tell us much less about whether a particular prac
tice is subordinating in a particular case and why.
One set of concerns that the anti-subordination literature has iden
tified focuses on what is typically referred to as social meaning. Here,
the arguments roughly divide into two categories. The first explains
that practices, institutions, and activities can perpetuate subordination
by creating, expressing, and/or reinforcing a hegemonic or dominant
societal contention that the members of certain groups, like African
Americans or women, are inferior to the members of other groups,
like whites or men.87 The second, related line of thought, most promi
nently associated with Kenneth Karst, maintains that practices, institu
tions, and activities can similarly sustain subordination by promoting a
hegemonic contention that the members of certain groups are not part
of the national or local community, and in the process can injure the
excluded people's sense of self and sense of belonging.88
formulation of another issue. The equal citizenship principle merely states the problem of
constitutional equality.").

87. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979) ("Practices which express and rein

force the social inequality of women to men are clear cases of sex-based discrimination in
the inequality approach."); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Deci
sions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960) ("[l]t would be the most unneutral of principles, impro
vised ad hoc, to require that a court faced with the present problem refuse to note a plain
f act about the society of the United States-the f act that the social meaning of segregation is
the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-off inferiority-or the other equally plain
fact that such treatment is hurtful to human beings."); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hol
lers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444 ("Racism is
both 100% speech and 100% conduct. Discriminatory conduct is not racist unless it also
conveys the message of white supremacy-unless it is interpreted within the culture to ad
vance the structure and ideology of white supremacy."); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. R EV. 935, 942-43 (1989) ("(The stigma] ap
proach focuses less on the concrete effects that a government action has on a group's posi
tion and more on the message that the action conveys to others. . . . For example, an explic
itly race-neutral policy that had the effect of excluding all blacks from admission to a state
university might brand blacks as inferior by conveying the message that, as a group, they are
not as capable as whites.").

88. See KARST, supra note 86, at 3 ("The principle of equal citizenship, as I use the term,
means this: Each individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society
as a respected, responsible, and participating member. Stated negatively, the principle for
bids the organized society to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent
caste or as a nonparticipant. The principle thus centers on those aspects of equality that are
most closely bound to the sense of self and the sense of inclusion in a community."); id. at 4
("Claims to equal citizenship have always carried an emotional charge in America, especially
when inequalities have attached to such attributes as race, sex, religion, or ethnicity. These
matters touch the heart because they touch the sense of belonging and therefore the sense of
self. Belonging is a basic human need. . . . The most heartrending deprivation of all is the
inequality of status that excludes people from full membership in the community, degrading
them by labeling them as outsiders, denying them their very selves."); id. at 11 ("This book
focuses on the hurt of exclusion. In the perspective offered here, citizenship means not just
rights but responsibility, not just autonomy but belonging."); see also Lawrence, supra note
87, at 438-39 ("Brown can also be read more broadly to articulate a principle central to any
substantive understanding of the equal protection clause, the foundation on which all anti
discrimination law rests. This is the principle of equal citizenship. Under that principle 'every
individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected,
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Linked to this discussion of social meaning, writers in the anti
subordination tradition have also argued that practices, institutions,
and activities can promote subordination by inflicting dignitary harms
on the members of targeted groups. In this case, concern centers on
practices that treat the members of disfavored classes as unworthy of
equal respect and . dignity and instead subject them to humiliation,
stigmatization, denigration, and degradation.89
Finally, and most concretely, anti-subordination writers argue that
practices, institutions, and activities can foster subordination by in
flicting a wide variety of material harms on the members of targeted
populations. Speaking generally, these writers have identified two,
connected categories of material harm.90 The first, emphasized by
Owen Fiss, Cass Sunstein, and others, focuses on classic indicators of
socioeconomic status and social welfare, explaining that practices
cause subordinating material harm when they systematically leave the
members of targeted groups with less wealth, less political power, less
protection from private or public violence, less education, less health,
less life expectancy, less access to housing, and/or less leisure.91 The
responsible, and participating member.' Furthermore, it requires the affirmative disestab
lishment of societal practices that treat people as members of an inferior or dependent caste,
as unworthy to participate in the larger community." (quoting Karst)).
89. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 87, at 47 ("Women's feelings about their experi
ences of sexual harassment are a significant part of its social impact. Like women who are
raped, sexually harassed women feel humiliated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed, and
cheap, as well as angry."); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321
(1997) ("Social status is the degree of prestige and honor that individuals or groups enjoy.
This prestige involves the approval, respect, admiration, or positive qualities imputed to a
person or group. Lower social status confers and imputes corresponding disapproval and
negative qualities. Although individuals may have different degrees of status within a single
group, they also have status because they are members of a group. One can have higher or
lower status, for example, because one is an immigrant, a woman, or a member of 'the upper
crust.' Critical race scholars have repeatedly noted that white Americans have certain status
privileges conferred on them merely by being white."); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Prin
ciple, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2430 ( 1994) ("A particular concern is that self-respect and its
social bases ought not to be distributed along the lines of race and gender. When someone is
a member of a group that is systematically subordinate to others, and when the group char
acteristic is highly visible, insults to self-respect are likely to occur nearly every day. An im
portant aspect 9f a system of caste is that social practices produce a range of obstacles to the
development of self-respect, largely because of the presence of the highly visible but morally
irrelevant characteristic that gives rise to lower-caste status.").
·

90. Although we generally categorize the anti-subordination tradition in different ways,
David Strauss also .notes a divide along these lines. See Strauss, supra note 87, at 941-42
('!There seem to be two .ways of understanding subjugation or subordination. One focuses on
the accumulation of disadvantages. A racial group that is worse off than all others in nearly
every significant measure of human welfa re might be said to be a 'subject race.' The second
emphasizes the state of being personally subject to the will of another. Slavery was the clear
est case of subordination. Under this view, the distinctive characteristic of a subordinated
group is that its members are systematically subject to violence at the hands of members of
another group, or must systematically yield to the commands of members of another
group.").
91. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107, 150 (1 976) ("[Blacks] have two other characteristics as a group that are critical in under-
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second focuses on control and autonomy, explaining that practices
cause subordinating material harm when they systematically leave the
members of targeted groups with less control or power over their own
lives and more subject to the control and direction of another person
or the state.92
Taken together, this body of work provides some important guid
ance and criteria. For example, this literature explains that practices
can cause subordination by inflicting dignitary or material injury on
individuals in targeted classes. This is definitely helpful information.
Yet at the same time, it does not reveal whether any particular pracstanding the function and reach of the Equal Protection Clause. One is that blacks are very
badly off, probably our worst-off class (in terms of material well-being second only to the
American Indians), and in addition they have occupied the lowest rung for several centuries.
In a sense, they are America's perpetual underclass."); id. at
("It is not just the socio
economic status of blacks as a group that explains their special position in equal protection
theory. It is also their political status. The power of blacks in the political arena is severely
limited."); Sunstein, supra note
at
("The motivating idea behind an anticaste princi
ple is that without good reason, social and legal structures should not turn differences that are

151-52

89,

2429

both highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point of view into systematic social disad
vantages. A systematic disadvantage is one that operates along standard and predictable

lines in multiple and important spheres of life and that applies in realms that relate to basic
participation as a citizen in a democracy. There is no algorithm by which to identify those
realms. As a provisional working list, we might include education, freedom from private and
public violence, income and wealth, political representation, longevity, health, and political
influence."); see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection,
N.Y.U. L. REV.
("In this Article, I argue that courts should
analyze equal protection cases from an anti-subordination perspective. Under the anti
subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordi
nated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole. This approach seeks to

61

1003, 1007 (1986)

eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and between whites and non
whites, through the development of laws and policies that directly redress those dispari
ties."); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
HARV. L. REV.
("Material
subordination . . . refers to the ways that discrimination and exclusion economically subordi
nated Blacks to whites and subordinated the life chances of Blacks to those of whites on al
most every level. This subordination occurs when Blacks are paid less for the same work,
when segregation limits access to decent housing, and where poverty, anxiety, poor health
care, and crime create a life expectancy for Blacks that is five to six years shorter than for

101

1331, 1377 (1988)

whites.").

92.

216

See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 87, at
("Sexual harassment at work critically
undercuts women's potential for work equality as a means to social equality. Beyond sur
vival, employment outside the home may offer women some promise of developing a range
of capacities for which the nurturing, cleaning, and servant role of housework and child care
provide little outlet. A job, no matter how menial, offers the potential for independence
from the nuclear family, which makes women dependent upon men for life necessities.");
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,
STAN. L. REV.
("The anti-subordination principle could be greatly improved by conceptualizing the

(1997)

49

691, 760

problem as one of gender subordination defined in hetero-patriarchal terms. Thus, sexual
harassment is understood as a mechanism by which an orthodoxy regarding masculinity and
femininity is enforced, policed, and perpetuated in the workplace."); Reva Siegel, Reasoning

from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 351 (1992) ("From a historical perspective it is clear that
abortion-restrictive regulation is caste legislation, a traditional mode of regulating women's
conduct, concerned with compelling them to perform the work that has traditionally defined
their subordinate social role and status.").
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tice operates in that way or causes those kinds of subordinating harms,
nor does it indicate how we are to ascertain the answers to these ques
tions.93
So, to return again to Virginia, how would we go about applying
the standard that opinion suggests? How can we determine whether a
particular practice denies women "full citizenship stature" or "cre
ate[ sJ or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women"?94 In the remainder of this Article, I propose to try to give
some content to the framework that Virginia outlines. More specifi
cally, Part II will explore the potential usefulness of the historical rec
ord.
History is not the sole source that one could draw upon in consid
ering how to flesh out Virginia's proposed standard. It is also not the
case that a historical record can decisively indicate whether a particu
lar practice currently operates to deny women equal citizenship and
maintain their inferiority. Over time, practices can be reborn in impor
tant ways to serve new functions, accomplish new purposes, and play
new roles.
But a historical record can usefully inform an inquiry into whether
a particular practice deprives women of equal citizenship. Considering
a practice at some distance from the present day can uncover and
highlight issues that may be hidden or submerged in current discus
sions. It can illuminate areas of concern, suggest factors that might be
relevant, and reveal ways in which a Court applying the Virginia
framework should be paying attention. It can help us identify some of
the questions that a reasonable decisionmaker implementing
Virginia's standard should be asking in deciding whether a specific
practice contributes to women's inequality.

93. The labor, controversy, and judgment involved in translating anti-subordination
theory into a specific agenda for legal reform is one reason that the relatively small body of
scholarship applying anti-subordination principles to particular practices has made some of
the most persuasive contributions to the anti-subordination tradition. This body of work in
cludes Richard Delgado, Charles Lawrence, and Mari Matsuda on hate speech, Catharine
MacKinnon on sexual harassment, and Reva Siegel on abortion regulation. See Richard
Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 89, 94 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); Lawrence, supra note 87, at 461-62,
464-65; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2336-39 (1989); MACKINNON, supra note 87, at 7, 9-10, 27, 51; Siegel,
supra note 92, at 370. This work tends not to self-consciously reflect on the fact of its par
ticularity. In other words, it tends not to explicitly analyze the fact that it is applying anti
subordination principles to a particular practice, and that those principles might apply dif
ferently in other contexts. But this body of scholarship does attempt to confront the ques
tions and gather the evidence involved in making the case for why, when, and how hate
speech, sexual harassment, abortion regulation, or some other specific practice causes spe
cific and identified subordinating injuries to specific and identified classes of people.
94. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532, 534 (19%).
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With this in mind, Part II turns to a historical record to wrestle
with what we would need to know in order to determine whether a
practice deprives women of "full citizenship stature" or operates "to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women."95 Since this project is importantly motivated by the Virginia
case, it takes as its case study the practice (or set of practices) that is
sex-segregated public education in the United States.
II.

SEX-SEGREGATED PUBLIC EDUCATION:

A CASE STUDY IN

USING HISTORY TO INFORM AN INQUIRY INTO WHETHER A
SPECIFIC PRACTICE DENIES WOMEN "FULL CITIZENSHIP
STATURE" OR MAINTAINS THEIR "LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC INFERIORITY"

The historical record of ·sex-segregated public education brings
into focus a variety of factors, issues, and questions that a Court could
usefully consider in determining the appropriate constitutional status
of sex-segregated public education under Virginia's framework. In the
process, this record also suggests that Virginia's "full citizenship"
standard may ultimately challenge, unsettle, and undermine many of
the foundational assumptions of the current sex discrimination juris
prudence, including some endorsed in Virginia itself.96
It is worth emphasizing again that this is not because the historical
record decisively establishes how sex-segregated public education, or
any other practice, presently operates or should currently be regu
lated. Indeed, one insight that the historical record of sex-segregated
public education brings to light is that whether, when, why, and how a
specific practice denies women "full citizenship stature" or "create[s]
or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women"
can change over time.97 This possibility is not acknowledged in .the
Virginia opinion, which seems to envision the practices that maintain
women's unequal status as more fixed and stable. But even a brief re
view of the historical record of sex-segregated public education dem
onstrates that a practice's role in promoting unequal citizenship and
legalized inferiority can evolve and shift.
Initially, for instance, public jurisdictions used sex segregation to
completely deny women and girls access to various levels of public
education. The exclusion of female students from public primary
schools was a common practice in colonial New England,98 and contin95. Id.
96. Id. at 532.

97. Id. at 532, 534.
98. Walter Herbert Small's thorough survey of colonial New England found only a small·
handful of references indicating that girls were educated in town schools, alongside boys or
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ued in the nation's first years.99 In the first part of the nineteenth cen
tury, in turn, the jurisdictions at the forefront of public education sys
tematically barred women from the new forms of secondary education
that were becoming available to men. Boston, for example, established
what most scholars consider to be the first public high school in the
United States in 1821.100 But it was only open to male students.101 The
Central High School in Philadelphia, which became the nation's first
public high school outside of Boston in 1836 and the future subject of
the Vorchheimer case, similarly excluded women}02
Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, though, the prac
tice of sex-segregated public education changed in important ways. As
the rise of the industrial era made literacy more important, more
Americans came to believe that women's role required schooling con
sistent with their racial and economic status. A variety of jurisdictions
in this period used sex-segregated education to expand women's inclu
sion and engagement in the public educational system. In the second
half of the nineteenth century, for instance, a number of cities that had
first opened secondary schools exclusively for men also created high
separately. Based on all the available evidence, he concluded that "girls were generally
barred out." WALTER HERBERT SMALL, EARLY NEW ENGLAND SCHOOLS 275-77 (1914).
Farmington, Connecticut, for instance, voted in 1687 to allocate twenty pounds '"for the
maintenance of a school for the year ensuing, for the instruction of all such children as shall
be sent to it, to learn to read and write the English tongue."' Id. at 277. Some Farmington
residents apparently objected to the linguistic imprecision, however, perhaps because some
girls attempted to attend the town school. The town clarified its initial decision the next year,
with a vote '"declar[ing] that all such is to be understood [as meaning] only male children
that are through their horn book."' Id.

99. Northampton, Massachusetts, for example, excluded all female students from its
public schools, a situation recorded in a rare lawsuit brought against the town in 1792. See
The Early Schools, in CENTENNIAL HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE 1 2, 1 2 (Northampton, Hampshire
Gazette 1886). As the Centennial edition of the Northampton Gazette would later recall,
"the town was indicted and fined" for its refusal to admit girls to its public schools. Id. The
legal basis for this court victory (like the identity of the plaintiffs) is unclear, as the court re
cords for the judicial challenge apparently no longer exist. Whatever the grounds for the de
cision, though, the Gazette recounted that Northampton responded to the judicial judgment
against the town in 1792 by voting, "'by a large majority,' to admit girls between the ages of 8
and 15 to the schools from May 1 to Oct. 31." Id.; see also 2 JAMES RUSSELL TRUMBULL,
HISTORY OF NORTHAMPTON MASSACHUSETTS, FROM ITS SETTLEMENT IN 1654, at 551-52
(1902) (quoting the report of the 1792 Northampton committee that recommended the es
tablishment of some coeducational public schools). It is worth noting, however, that
Northampton does not appear to have consistently abided by the legal judgment against it.
According to the town's history, "[g]irls were not admitted to the town schools every year
after permission was first granted. In 1799, the town refused to make any appropriation for
schooling them." Id. at 585.
100. See, e.g., EMIT DUNCAN GRIZZELL, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGH
SCHOOL IN NEW ENGLAND BEFORE 1865, at 277 (1922); ALEXANDER JAMES INGLIS, THE
RISE OF THE HIGH SCHOOL IN MASSACHUSETTS 15 (1911).
101. See INGLIS, supra note 100, at 16; SEMI-CENTENNIAL ANNIVERSARY OF THE
ENGLISH HIGH SCHOOL 76-78 {Boston, Nathan Sawyer & Son 1871).
102. See Yorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1975); supra text ac
companying notes 40-43.
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schools for female students. Boston established a public high school
for women in 1854,103 and Philadelphia opened a normal school for
women in 1848 that became an academic high school in 1893.1.04
This movement, however, mostly included southern juris
dictions, such as Baltimore,105 Charleston,106 Louisville,107 and New
"
103. This school had opened in 1852 as a small two-year normal schoof for the training
of grammar school teachers. See O L IV E B. WHITE, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE GIRLS'
HIGH SCHOOL OF BOSTON 9, 14-16 (1952); LUCY R. WOODS, A HISTORY OF THE GIRLS'
HIGH SCHOOL OF BOSTON, 1852-1902, at 6 (1904); Girls in .the Public Schools of Boston, 13
AM. J. EDUC. 243, 263-66 (1863). By 1853, however, women had secured twenty-seven hun
dred signatures on a petition demanding a High School for Girls in Boston. See HARRIOT K.
HUNT, GLANCES AND GLIMPSES 309 (Boston, John P. Jewett.& Co. 1856).
Boston had actually established an earlier High School for Girls in 1826. See Girls in the
Public Schools of Boston, supra, at 246 (quoting the first catalogue of the High School for
Girls). But the city closed this women's high school after only two years, citing specifically
the tremendous demand for it. See id. at 247. As the Boston School Committee explained,
young men attended Boston's English High School in order to prepare for "'professions and
pursuits,"' so rigorous meritocractic selection was called for in order to identify the most
promising male scholars. Id. at 250 (quoting report adopted at February 21, 1828 meeting of
Boston School Committee). In contrast, the School Committee insisted that young women
would have no professional use for their educations once they married, and concluded that
singling out the most academically promising women would therefore be inconsistent with
the purpose .of the High School for Girls. See id. (quoting report adopted at February 21,
1828 meeting of Boston School Committee).
. '

.

.

.

.

104. See . Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 328; ROBERT WAYNE CLARK, THE GENESIS OF
THE PHILADELPHIA HIGH SCHOOL FOR GIRLS 13, 25, 36, 90-92 (1938). For articles advo
cating the creation of a High School for Girls in Philadelphia, see Free Academy for Girls, 50
GODEY'S LADY'S BOOK 468, 468 (1855) ("When is the 'High School for Girls' tO be estab
lished in Philadelphia?"); High Schools for Girls, 46 GODEY'S LADY'S BOOK 176, 176 (1853)
("Philadelphia has one of the most flourishing High Schools for Boys in the United
States. . . . Where is its twin seminary for the daughters of the people? Are these, the jewels
of the State, the grace and glory of their homes, to be forgotten, and left in comparative ig
norance, when the character, the destiny of the coming generation are to be in their keep
ing?"); Philadelphia High School for Girls, 48 GODEY'S LADY'S BOOK 464, 464 (1854)
("When is this institution to be opened? The High School for Boys has been sustained iq the
most liberal manner many years, and now a new and costly edifice for the school is nearly
prepared. Will not the men of Philadelphia add beauty as �ell as strength to the recent act of
'Consolidation,' by founding a HIGH SCHOOL FOR GIRLS?").
105. Baltimore established a high school exclusively for white boys in 1839, and founded
two high schools for white girls in 1 844. See Baltimore Public Schools, 13 COMMON SCH . J.
102, 103 (1851); A.O. Mayo, The Organization and Development of the American Common
School in the Atlantic and Central States of the South, I830 to I860, in 1 REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION FOR THE YEAR 1899-1900, at 427, 443 (1901). Before "1867
there was no provision for the public schooling of colored children." Id.
106. Charleston established a high school for white boys in 1839. See William M. Geer,
The High School of Charleston: Ninety-eight .Years of Service, i S. ASS'N Q. 385, 385-86
(1937). But it did not create a high school for white girls until 1858. "See MARY TAYLOR, A
H ISTORY OF THE MEMMINGER NORMAL SCHOOL CHARLESTON, S.C. 1, 4, 7-8 (1941).
·

107. White men in Louisville, Kentucky had long had access to a "school known at dif
ferent periods in its history as Jefferson Seminary, Louisville College, and the academic de
partment of the University of Louisville." ALVIN FAYETTE LEWIS, H ISTORY OF HIGHER
EDUCATION IN KENTUCKY 348 (U.S. Bureau of Education, Circular of Information No. 3,
Washington, Government Printing Office 1899). The city formally converted this school into
a white male high school in 1851, the same year the city provided by charter for a white
female high school. See id. at 348-49. The school for white female students, however, did not
actually open until 1 856. See id. at 349; see also REPORT OF THE GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL OF
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Orleans. H18 Similarly, a spate of mostly southern states
Georgia,1 12
(including
Alabama,109
Delaware,1 10
Florida,11 1
Mississippi,113 New Jersey,114 North Carolina,115 Oklahoma,116
LOUISVILLE, KY. 2 (1916). Louisville also opened a Manual Training High School, exclu
sively for white male students, in 1892. See SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANUAL
TRAINING HIGH SCHOOL 9-10 (1908).

108. New Orleans opened a high school for white boys in 1845, and a high school for
white girls in 1847. See Elsa Louise Behrend, The New Orleans Public School System Since
the Civil War 4-5 (1931) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tulane University) (on file with author).
109. See An Act To create and establish an industrial school in the State of Alabama for
white girls, § 6, 1893 Ala. Acts 1002, 1004 (providing for "[t)he establishment and mainte
nance of a first-class industrial school for the education of white girls in the State of
Alabama in industrial and scientific branches, at which said girls may acquire a thorough
normal school education, together with a knowledge of kindergarten instruction and music;
also a knowledge of telegraphy, type-writing, stenography, photography and phonography").
110. See An Act Providing for Securing the Site, Erecting, Equipping and Furnishing
Buildings for a Women's College Affiliated with Delaware College, at Newark, Delaware,
and to Provide the Method of Paying for the Same, ch. 124, § 1, 27 Del. Laws 311, 311 (1913)
(providing for "a Women's College affiliated with Delaware College, at Newark,
Delaware").
111. See An Act to abolish the Florida Agricultural College, ch. 5384, §§ 12, 22, 1905
Fla. Laws ch. 13, 37, 45, 53 (establishing "The Florida Female College," for " [n]one but
female white students," "to teach and instruct in all the higher branches of education, and in
all the useful arts and sciences that may be necessary or appropriate to be taught in like insti
tutions").
112. See An Act to establish a Normal and Industrial College as a branch of the State
University, for the education of white girls; to appropriate money for the same, and for other
purposes, §§ 1 , 10, 1889 Ga. Laws 10, 10, 13 (establishing "a college for the education of
white girls, to be known as the 'Georgia Normal and Industrial College"' to teach such
"practical industries as may tend to fit and prepare girls for occupations which are consistent
with fe minine refinement and modesty").
113. See An Act to create and establish an Industrial Institute in the State of Mississippi,
and a College for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences, ch. 30, §§ l, 6, 1884
Miss. Laws 50, 50, 52 (establishing "the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the
Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi in the Arts and Sciences," to provide "a
thorough normal school education, together with a knowledge of kindergarten instruction,
also a knowledge of telegraphy, stenography and photography; also a knowledge of drawing,
painting, designing, and engraving in their industrial application; also a knowledge of fancy,
practical and general needle-work; and, also, a knowledge of bookkeeping").
114. On the founding of the New Jersey College for Women in 1918, see THE EARLY
HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY COLLEGE FOR WOMEN: PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS BY DEAN
DOUGLASS 5-14 ( 1928) ; Rutgers College, Meeting of the Trustees of Rutgers College in New
Jersey 4 (Apr. 12, 1918) (on file with author; Rutgers University Libraries) ("Resolved that
the Trustees of Rutgers College do establish a Woman's College as a department of the
State University of New Jersey maintained by the Trustees.").
115. See An act to establish a normal and industrial school for white girls, ch. 139, §§ 1,
5, 1891 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126-27 (establishing "an institution for the white race under the
corporate name of 'The Normal and Industrial School"' "to give to young women such edu
cation as shall fit them for teaching" and "to give instruction to young women in drawing,
telegraphy, type-writing, stenography, and such other industrial arts as may be suitable to
their sex and conducive to their support and usefulness").
116. See An Act To Establish An Industrial Institute And College For Girls In The
State Of Oklahoma, And Providing For Its Location And Government, §§ 2-3, 13, 1908
Okla. Sess. Laws 614, 614-16 (establishing "the 'Oklahoma Industrial Institute and College
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South Carolina,1 17 and Texas)118 established public women's colleges in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If one were to
evaluate whether, when, why, and how sex-segregated public educa
tion operated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
deny women "full citizenship stature,"119 the conclusions one would
draw would have to differ, in at least some respects, from the assess
ments that one would make about the practice of sex-segregated pub
lic education as it existed a half century earlier.
Nevertheless, the historical record of sex-segregated public educa
tion can usefully inform an investigation into whether, when, why, and
how sex-segregated public education currently functions to deprive
women of "full citizenship" or maintain their "inferiority."120 Let's ex
amine that record to see how this can work.
A. D ifferent Populations of Women A re Not Necessarily
Interchangeable in Considering What D enies Women "Full
Citizenship" and Maintains Their "Inferiority"
Virginia, following the Court's earlier sex discrimination cases, ap
pears to assume that different populations of women are interchange
able for constitutional purposes. The Virginia opinion, like the one in
Hogan before it, notes that the school it is reviewing was once racially
segregated.121 But neither Virginia nor Hogan ever explores or menfor Girls,"' open to "[a]ll white female citizens of Oklahoma between the ages of twelve (12)
and thirty-five (35)," "to give instruction in industrial arts, the English language and the
various branches of mathematical, physical, natural and economical sciences, with special
reference to their application in the industries of life").
117. See An Act to Establish a Normal and Industrial College in the State of South
Carolina for the Education of White Girls, §§ 1, 5, 1891 S.C. Acts 1102, 1102, 1104 (estab
lishing "'The South Carolina Industrial and Winthrop Normal College"' "for the thorough
education of the 'white girls' of South Carolina, the main objects of which shall be (1) to give
to young women such education as shall fit them for teaching; (2) to give instruction to
young women in . . . such other industrial arts as may be suitable to their sex and conducive
to their support and usefulness").
118. See An Act to create and establish an industrial institute and college in the State of
Texas for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences, ch. 132, §§ 1, 5, 1901 Tex. Gen.
Laws 306, 306-07 (establishing "the 'Texas Industrial Institute and College for the Education
of White Girls of the State of Texas in the Arts and Sciences,"' "at which such girls may ac
quire a literary education, together with a knowledge of kindergarten instruction; also a
knowledge of telegraphy, stenography and photography; also a knowledge of drawing,
painting, designing and engraving, in their industrial application; also a knowledge of general
needle-work, including dressmaking; also a knowledge of bookkeeping; also a thorough
knowledge of scientific and practical cooking, including a chemical study of food; also a
knowledge of practical housekeeping").
119. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
120.

Id. at 532, 534.

121. See id. at 546 n.16 ("VMI has successfully managed another notable change. The
school admitted its first African-American cadets in 1968."); Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719-20 (1982) ("In 1884, the Mississippi Legislature created the
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tions the possibility that a sex-segregated public school might inflict
somewhat different injuries on white and African-American women,
or that the practice of sex-segregated public education might be par
tially motivated or structured by concerns tied to race and class. In this
regard, the opinions track much of the scholarly literature on sex
segregated public education, which has frequently overlooked or un
deremphasized the ways in which race and class have shaped sex
segregated public education in the United States.122
The historical record of sex-segregated public education reveals,
however, that practices can deny "full citizenship stature,"123 and "ere-

Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of
Mississippi, now the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States."); id. at
727 n.13 ("Apparently, the impetus for founding MUW came not from a desire to provide
women with advantages superior to those offered men, but rather from a desire to provide
white women in Mississippi access to state-supported higher learning. In 1856, Sally Reneau
began agitating for a college for white women.").
On the Mississippi University for Women's resistance to racial desegregation, see
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 722 (1992) ("Despite this Court's decisions in Brown
I and Brown II, Mississippi's policy of de jure segregation continued. The first black student
was not admitted to the University of Mississippi until 1962, and then only by court order.
For the next 12 years the segregated public university system in the State remained largely
intact. Mississippi State University, Mississippi University for Women, University of
Southern Mississippi, and Delta State University each admitted at least one black student
during these years, but the student composition of these institutions was still almost com
pletely white.") (citation omitted).
122. To take a very prominent example, M. Elizabeth Tidball's fa mous study of 1500
women listed in Who's Who of American Women compared the graduates of coeducational
colleges and women's colleges from 1910 to 1960. See M. Elizabeth Tidball, Perspective on
Academic Women and Affirmative Action, 54 EDUC. REC. 130, 132 (1973). It found that the
women's colleges produced approximately "two-fold" more women "achievers" per thou
sand women graduates per decade than the coeducational colleges. See id. Based on this
data, Tidball concluded that "men students and women fa culty emerge as primary determi
nants of the number of women achievers. The fact that the women's colleges have none of
the former and more of the latter than coeducational institutions may largely explain their
significantly greater contribution to the wider society of career-successful women during the
past 50 years." Id. at 134. Tidball's study, however, did not control for either the class or the
race of the female graduates.
Later work by Mary J. Oates and Susan Williamson found no difference between the
achievement levels of women who graduated from small women's colleges in the 1930s and
women who graduated from small coeducational colleges in that decade, once one removed
the women who graduated from the most elite, and wealthy, private women's colleges of the
era, the "Seven Sisters" colleges. See Mary J. Oates & Susan Williamson, Women 's Colleges
and Women Achievers, 3 SIGNS 795, 799-800 (1978) ("The [Seven Sisters] produced achiev
ers at the rate of sixty-one per 10,000 graduates during the decade of the 1930s. In sharp con
trast, the small [non-Seven Sisters women's colleges] and small [coeducational colleges] each
produced at a rate of eighteen achievers per 10,000 women graduates. The [Seven Sisters]
rate was 3.4 times that of all other small colleges and four times that of all other institutions,
regardless of size. With the exception of the 1940s, at no time do they account for fewer than
half of women's-college achievers."). Oates and Williamson concluded that "[i]t is not suffi
cient to observe that (the Seven Sisters] colleges were more selective in admissions than the
other women's colleges. Rather, it is our contention that the average socioeconomic level of
the student body in these seven colleges may be even more critical in accounting for the dif
ferences, although selectivity does remain a fa ctor." Id. at 803.
123. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
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ate or perpetuate . . . legal, social, and economic inforiority,"124 for one
group of women and not another, or can maintain the unequal status
of different sets of women in different ways. In the case of public edu
cation, for example, race and sex segregation, as well as class stratifica
tion, have long been practically and symbolically intertwined, although
the precise nature of the interactions has shifted over time.
Public school systems in the United States have not made uniform
efforts to segregate the sexes. Until the B rown decision and its en
forcement, sex-segregated public schools were also frequently racially
segregated, especially in the South where sex-segregated public educa
tion was particularly concentrated. More specifically, many sex
segregated public schools were explicitly limited to whites,125 and only
slightly less explicitly restricted to students from relatively privileged
socioeconomic backgrounds. The Mississippi Industrial Institute and
College, for example, was founded in 1884 to serve white women ex
clusively, and white ladies more precisely. The school, which would
eventually become the subject of the Hogan decision,126 trained its
students to be teachers and secretaries. But it also imparted skills, like
"drawing, painting, designing, and engraving," that were sought in a
specific class of comparatively affluent women.127 In contrast, the same
southern states that most strongly supported the sex-based segregation
of white students in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries almost al
ways operated coeducational schools for African-Americans.128
124. Id. at 534.
125. Through the middle of the twentieth century, for instance, Texas A&M limited
admission to students who were both white and male. See TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VII, § 7
("Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provi
sion shall be made for both."); Davis Holds Texas A.&M. ls Boys School, BRYAN DAILY
EAGLE, Jan. 5, 1934, at 1, 4 (reporting opinion from the district court of Brazos County,
Texas that upheld the exclusion of women from Texas A&M); Texas Girls A re Denied Right
To Enroll in A . & M. College As Writ ls Refused By Court, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 6, 1934, at
1, 2 (reporting same decision). Similarly, Virginia maintained four public colleges by the end
of the nineteenth century, all limited to white men: the University of Virginia, the Virginia
Military Institute, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and William and Mary College. See The
Co-Ordinate College-A Vital Matter, 10 VA. J. EDUC. 410, 410 (1917). For more examples
of white-only admissions policies in both men's and women's public schools, see supra notes
105-109, 111-113, 1 15-118, 121.
126. See An Act to create and establish an Industrial Institute in the State of Mississippi,
and a College for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences, ch. 30, § 1, 1 884 Miss.
Laws 50, 50; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 719-20; EDWARD MAYES, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN
MISSISSIPPI 245-55 (U.S. Bureau of Education, Circular of Information No. 2, Washington,
Government Printing Office 1899); supra text accompanying notes 47-49, 52-60.
127. An Act to create and establish an Industrial Institute in the State of Mississippi,
and a College for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences § 6; see also statutes
cited supra notes 109-118.
128. For example, the only public institution of higher learning open to African
American students in Texas before 1947 was coeducational. See An Act to establish an
Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, for the benefit of the colored youths and to
make appropriations therefor, ch. 92, § 1, 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws 136, 136 (establishing "an
Agricultural and Mechanical College for the benefit of the colored youths of this State").
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Through this structure, sex-segregated public education became a
means of recognizing and developing the race and class status of rela
tively privileged whites, while simultaneously emphasizing the de
graded racial and economic status of African-Americans.
One thing this record helps us understand is why someone like
Justice Powell might assume that the historical practice of sex
segregated public education has been benign and geared to the mutual
benefit of both sexes.129 This vision is not an accurate description of
the past. But the social power of this understanding of history proba
bly reflects the fact that the practice of sex-segregated public educa
tion was a form of privilege for some women in some respects.
Stated more concretely, it seems clear that white women, especially
elite white women, received various dignitary benefits from the prac
tice of sex-segregated public education. Treatment as a lady implied a
certain level of dignity. Like the notion that the home is the particular
province of women, it was historically associated with a judgment that
the women designated as ladies were to be accorded some respect in
arenas considered domestic, such as courtship, home life, and child
rearing.130 This is not to say that the practice of sex-segregated public
The Texas State University for Negroes, founded in 1947, also admitted both men and
women.See An Act providing for the establishment, support, maintenance and direction of a
University of the first class for the instruction and training of colored people of this state, to
be known as "The Texas State University for Negroes," ch.29, § 12, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 36,
40 ("The term 'qualified applicant' as used in this Act shall mean any colored person who
meets the educational requirements for entrance to the same course or courses in the
University of Texas or any of its branches.The term 'colored person' has the same meaning
as contained in the provisions of the Texas Constitution requiring separate schools, . . . to
wit: a negro or person of African descent.").
Similarly, the only form of public higher education open to blacks in Virginia through
the first half of the twentieth century was a coeducational school, first called the Virginia
Normal and Collegiate Institute and eventually renamed the Virginia State College for
Negroes. See STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, VIRGINIA COLLEGES: A BULLETIN OF

INFORMATION ABOUT THE STATE COLLEGES AND THE COLLEGES UNDER PRIVATE
CONTROL IN VIRGINIA 19 (1942). Louisville, Kentucky, in tum, operated sex-segregated

high schools for its white students in the early twentieth century, but a coeducational high
school for African-Americans. See Reports ofthe Louisville School Board for the Years 1901-

1902 and 1902-1903, in CITY OF LOUISVILLE: ANNUAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDING AUGUST 31, 1903, AND DECEMBER 31, 1903, at 240, 247 {1905); supra note 107;
infra notes 156, 164-166 and accompanying text.

Alcorn University, Mississippi's first public college for African-Americans, was limited
to male students upon its founding in 1871, but became coeducational in 1895. See W.
MILAN DAVIS, PUSHING FORWARD: A H ISTORY OF ALCORN A. & M. COLLEGE AND
PORTRAITS OF SOME OF ITS SUCCESSFUL GRADUATES 10-11, 27-29 (1938). In his 1895 re
port to the Alcorn trustees, which advocated establishing coeducation, President Thomas J.
Calloway explained that he "'had visited all the leading schools for colored people in
Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky and
Mississippi, and [was) familiar with the workings of those in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and
Missouri.Alcorn College [was) the only one, strictly speaking, that [was) for boys only."' Id.
at 25, 27; see also infra text accompanying notes 134-135.

129. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
130. Writing about a somewhat earlier era, Nancy Cott has nicely drawn out some of the
ways in which what she calls "(t)he doctrine of woman's sphere opened to women (reserved
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education caused white women to suffer no dignitary harm. We can
note at the outset that the respect associated with ladyhood was quite
different from, and not necessarily equivalent to, the respect granted
to white men. But sex-segregated public education was nevertheless
something of a mixed practice for white women. In contrast, sex
segregated public education inflicted unambiguous and particularly
harsh dignitary harms on African-American women. Unlike white
women, they were subject to the authoritatively enforced contention
that they did not need or deserve to be treated like ladies, that be
cause of their race they were not entitled to even the modicum of re
spect otherwise associated with their sex.131
Similarly, if one considers the practice of sex-segregated public
education from the standpoint of material injury, women's public
schools gave many of their students more access to public education
than they had had before. Here too, moreover, the material harm that
women suffered as a result of their exclusion from the public schools
reserved for white men differed dramatically for white and black
women, even if neither group had access to the educational institu
tions where, as we will see, 132 the social capital most associated with
economic and political success was distributed. Consider Mississippi's
system of higher education again. The Mississippi Industrial Institute
and College, discussed more below,133 trained white women to be la
dies. Alcorn University of Mississippi, founded in 1871 as the state's
first public college open to African-Americans,134 trained its students
to be farmers.135

for them) the avenues of domestic influence, religious morality, and child nurture." NANCY
F. Corr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1 7801835, at 200 (2d ed. 1997).
131. For an excellent account of black women's efforts in the second half of the nine
teenth century and the beginning of the twentieth to win admission to the cars that railroads
reserved for "ladies," see Barbara Y. Welke, When A ll the Women Were White, and All the
Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13 LAW & HIST.
REV. 261, 276 (1995) ("Regulations barring people of color from ladies' accommodations
and assigning women and men of color alike to smoking cars reflected the assumption 'that
all the women were white, and all the blacks were men.' This assumption denied people of
color the right so fundamental to defining class status in nineteenth-century America, that is,
the right of women of color to be recognized as ladies. In marked contrast to the accepted
rule for first-class white travel, there was no attempt to provide women of color traveling
first-class separate, superior facilities.").
132. See infra text accompanying notes 183-192.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 168-169.
134. See An Act to establish and maintain Alcorn University of Mississippi, and for
other purposes, ch. 327, § 4, 1871 Miss. Laws 716, 717; DAVIS, supra note 128, at 10-11; supra
note 128.
135. See An Act to establish and organize Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, and to
regulate the government of the same, ch. 19, § 1, 1878 Miss. Laws 118, 119 ("Be it enacted by
the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, That the institution known as the Alcorn
University, is hereby established as, and declared to be, an agricultural college for the educa-
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Once B rown was decided and enforced, the connection between
race and sex segregation in public education shifted, but some jurisdic
tions still used the practice of sex segregation to express and enforce a
(gendered) message of white supremacy and African-American inferi
ority. In the years after B rown, a number of the school districts or
dered to end their practice of racial segregation went to court to argue
that they should be permitted to establish sex segregation in their
schools instead. Public school officials argued in these suits that insti
tuting sex segregation would have the immediate effect of reshuffling
white and black students into two groups of approximately equal ra
cial composition. A school district with a white and a black high
school, for example, could smoothly transform its two schools into one
for girls and one for boys, both of which would be racially integrated.136
This sex-based reshuffling also had the advantage (from the school
districts' perspective) of ensuring that white girls could remain sepa
rated from black boys despite the abolition of legalized racial segrega
tion. Maintaining this separation had been one of the primary histori
cal justifications for racial segregation.137 It functioned as a way of
degrading African-Americans: Legal authorities sought to shield white
women from black men, but never expressed concern about protecting
black women from white men.138 At the same time, it also served to
simultaneously honor white women and justify their confinement.139
·

tion of the colored youth of the State, and to be hereafter known as the Alcorn Agricultural
and Mechanical College of the State of Mississippi.").

136. See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., No. 3983, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss. July
14, 1970) (findings of fact and recommendations), ruling deferred, Nos. 28030 & 28042, slip
op. at 2 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1 970) (per curiam) (permitting sex segregation to continue); Moore
v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed at re
quest of all parties, 421 F.2d 1407, 1 407 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Tammany
Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. La. 1969), amended on other grounds, 316 F.
Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970); Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. 16173, slip op. at 1-3
(E.D. La. June 9, 1969).
137. On the central role that white America's concerns about preventing sexual contact
between white women and black men played in promoting racial segregation in the United
States, see, for example, MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: I LLICIT SEX IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 1 -6 (1997); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So
LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 265 (1979) ("Behind every discussion and skirmish
involving racial separation lurked the specter of unrestrained black lust and sexuality, with
that most feared of consequences-racial amalgamation or, as it was now popularly called,
miscegenation."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1297, 1 343-53, 1365-70 (1998).
1 38. See, e.g., VICTORIA E. BYNUM, UNRULY WOMEN: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL AND
SEXUAL CONTROL IN THE OLD SOUTH 5, 9, 96-98 (1992); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF
LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO
THE PRESENT 149-50 (1985); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women's
History and the Metalanguage of Race, 17 SIGNS 251, 262-66 (1992); Eva Saks, Representing
Miscegenation Law, RARITAN, Fall 1988, at 39, 43.
139. See, e.g., CATHERINE CLINTON, THE PLANTATION MISTRESS: WOMAN'S WORLD
IN THE OLD SOUTH 87-89, 209-10 (1982); ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE
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In the years after B rown was decided, white America's obsessive
fears about interracial sex and marriage (often pejoratively called mis
cegenation)140 only intensified.141 Yet the courts reviewing the schools'
remedial strategies-after B rown but before the application of height
ened scrutiny to sex-based state action-routinely upheld sex
segregated public education, at the very same moment that they were
striking down racial segregation in public schools.142 They did not see,
or they did not acknowledge, the connection between race and sex.
PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 235-36, 241
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE
POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, at 72, 82-83, 96 (1996);
JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMES AND THE
WOMEN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 149-57 (rev. ed. 1993).

(1988);

140 . For a discussion of the historical origins of this term, see Hasday, supra note 137, at
1343 n.166.
141. James Jackson Kilpatrick, a white southerner, offered a typical example of this
mode of reasoning in 1962. As he explained:
The arguments of anthropology are of interest to the South, and I would not wish to leave
any impression that would minimize their importance; the fear of ultimate racial inter
breeding, encouraged by prospective generations of desegregated and integrated school sys
tems, is a very real fear in the South and not an imagined one. If these Negro characteristics
are innate, the white Southerner sees nothing but disaster to his race in risking an acceler
ated intermingling of blood lines. And even if these Negro characteristics are not innate, the
white Southerner wants no intimate association with them anyhow. And he is determined
not to let his children be guinea pigs for any man's social experiment.

JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION 72
(1962); see also O.R. WILLIAMS, SR., SEGREGATION AND COMMON SENSE 166 (1961) ("The

Supreme Court's school and other desegregation decisions are forcing the white people of
this Nation to associate with the Negro race. Close association with each other-especially
while young-is all that is necessary to mongrelize the races."); WILLIAM D. WORKMAN,
JR., THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH 212 (1960) ("[The white southerner] finds complete repug
nance in the idea of any mixing of the races, and that is one of his fundamental objections to
racial integration in the public schools."). For contemporary assessments of the political
landscape in the years after Brown, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS '174 (1962) ("[W]hen the Court
had just pronounced its new integration principle, . . . it was subject to scurrilous attack by
men who predicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to 'mongrelization of
the race' and that this was the result the Court had really willed . . . ."); WALTER F .
MURPHY, ELEMENTS O F JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193 (1964) ("[l]t i s even more clear that ra
cial intermarriage-'mongrelization'-has been the great bete noire of white southern soci
ety and one of the chief reasons behind the resistance to school integration."); Louis H.
Pollak, The Supreme Court and the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 15, 45 n.79 (1961) ("[T]he constitutional problem presented in Nairn v. Nairn [an inter
racial marriage case] is widely thought to be so sensitive as to make hazardous any generali
zations based on this unique history."); Andrew L. Kaufman, Book Review, 7 NAT. L.F. 154,
155 (1962) ("We may assume that the Court would not have taken this extraordinary course
of action had the main issue in the case [Nairn v. Nairn) not been the explosive issue of
miscegenation.").
142. See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., No. 3983, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Miss. July
14, 1970) (findings of fact and recommendations) ("[T]he Court finds that defendants have
met their burden of showing that the separation by sex plan stems from sound educational
purposes as distinguished from racially discriminatory purposes."), ruling deferred, Nos.
28030 & 28042, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1970) (per curiam) (permitting sex segregation
to continue); Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969)
("The court recognizes that the trend in modern education is in the other direction. But edu-
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In sum, the question of whether, when, why, and how a practice
denies women "full citizenship stature,"143 or "create[s] or perpetu
ate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women,"144 can eas
ily have different answers for different populations of women. Class
and especially race have long been embedded in the practice of sex
segregated public education, for instance. Indeed, in light of this his
tory, it should not be surprising to learn that many of the communities
that have recently been most interested in establishing sex segregation

cational decisions are for the School Board alone. Many school districts in this country have
long operated separate schools for boys and girls. This educational philosophy is also prac
ticed in many colleges and universities although their number is decreasing every year."),
appeal dismissed at request of all panies, 421 F.2d 1407, 1407 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. La. 1969) ("The school
board offers this proposal only as a transitory measure designed to ease the conversion to a
unitary system. For the reasons set forth in Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
supra, the Court will approve this proposal for the 1969-70 school year."), amended on other
grounds, 316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970); Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. 16173,
slip op. at 1-3 (E.D. La. June 9, 1969) ("ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
defendant St. James Parish School Board implement and effectuate for the 1969-70 school
year its plan to effect a unitary, non racial school system for St. James Parish . . . . All boys,
grades 1-12, from Central and Romeville will attend Central School . . . . All girls, grades 112, from Central and Romeville will attend Romeville School. . . . All girls grades 5-12, for
merly attending St. James High School, Magnolia High School, Magnolia Elementary, and
Consolidated Elementary will attend the St. James High School . . . . All boys, grades 5-12,
formerly attending St. James High School, Magnolia Elementary, Consolidated Elementary
will attend the Magnolia High School.").
After the Supreme Court had applied heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications,
the Fifth Circuit did hold that a school district could not impose mandatory sex segregation
on its entire school system as a means of remedying its former practice of racial segregation.
See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 620-25 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1977). This
decision, however, ultimately relied on new statutory rather than new constitutional argu
ments. It held that the school district's remedial strategy violated the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1 974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514, which prohibited states from
denying equal educational opportunity on the basis of sex, see 560 F.2d at 620-25 & n.7. In
the course of this litigation, which forced the school district to defend its use of sex segrega
tion, the district alluded to community concerns about contact between white girls and black
boys, arguing "that it should be permitted to continue its present modified plan because it
fears that whites will leave the public school system if sex-desegregation is implemented." Id.
at 624. The Fifth Circuit held that this was "an impermissible basis for refusing to comply
with the statutorily mandated scheme." Id.; see also Helen Dewar, Blacks Boycott Sex
Segregated Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1977, at A32, A32 (noting that, " [a]ccording to
Robert Wilson Jr., the one black member of the school board [at issue in this case], the
[school district's sex segregation] plan was drafted in 1969 to 'prevent black males and white
females from having any contact' in the classrooms"); id. (reporting that black students in
this school district had begun boycotting their classes in August 1977 to protest the sex seg
regation); Merrill Sheils, Segregation by Sex, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1977, at 97, 97 ("'They
never had any idea of changing the situation,' says Robert Wilson, the only black member of
the school board. 'It has always been a racial issue. The idea is to keep the black boys from
having any contact with the white girls-pure and simple.'"); id. ("Bernard Dunaway, the
board's president, indicates that there is some truth to Robert Wilson's charge that whites
prefer to keep the sexes separate for racial reasons. Boys and girls could attend school to
gether before 1969, he explains, because 'we had one school for whites and another school
for coloreds."').
143. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
1 44.

Id. at 534.

December 2002)

Women's "Full Citizens hip"

791

in their public schools are much less privileged than the elite groups
that historically dominated single-sex public education. For many
people, the practice of sex-segregated public education continues to
have elite connotations, and the contemporary notion that sex segre
gation will help elevate communities traditionally denied elite status
and privilege builds on this line of thought. In 1991, for example,
Detroit sought to open three all-male academies for boys in elemen
tary school and j unior high.145 The city argued that the schools would
be manifestations of racial pride and sites of heightened opportunity
in a predominately African-American and poor jurisdiction.146 These
sorts of aspirations, of course, still leave plenty of room for the possi
bility that Detroit's single-sex schools would have contributed to
women's inequality, and in fact a federal court barred Detroit from
opening the schools in sex-segregated form long before Virginia was
decided.147 The historical record suggests, however, that in considering
145.

See Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist.

(E.D. Mich. 1991).

of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1 005-06
'

146. See id. at 1006 ("The Academies offer special programs including a class entitled
'Rites of Passage', an Afrocentric (Pluralistic) curriculum, futuristic lessons in preparation
for 21st century careers, an emphasis on male responsibility, mentors, Saturday classes, indi
vidualized counseling, extended classroom hours, and student uniforms.").
In 1996, Governor Pete Wilson of California endorsed sex-segregated public education
in terms resonant with the Detroit debate. As he explained in his State of the State Address
that year:
Some cities around the nation have found success with all-male classrooms for at-risk boys.
There, strong male teachers serve as an alternative to gang leaders.
So I propose establishing all-male Empowerment Academies as magnet schools. There
boys can find the discipline and role models they'll need to escape a life on the streets.
In the same way, young girls and their parents should have the option of all-female schools.
I'd especially like to see such a school offer girls the opportunity to concentrate on math and
science.
3 JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY: LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
REGULAR SESSION, at 4311 (1996) (statement of Gov. Wilson).
147.

1995-96

See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1014. As the court explained:

In Mississippi v. Hogan, the Supreme Court held that exclusion of an individual from a
publicly-funded school because of his or her sex violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, unless the defendant can show the sex-based "classification serves
'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed"' are "sub
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives."

None of the[] findings meet the defendant's burden of showing how the exclusion of
females from the Academies is necessary to combat unemployment, dropout and homicide
rates among urban males. There is no evidence that the educational system is failing urban
males because females attend schools with males. In fact, the educational system is also fail
ing females. Thus, the Court concludes the application of the second prong of the Hogan test
to the facts at hand, makes it likely that th� plaintiffs will succeed on a constitutional argu
ment.

Id.

at 1006, 1008 (citations omitted).
After this legal defeat, the Detroit school board agreed to admit female students to the
three schools at issue in Garrett. See CLIFFORD WATSON & GENEVA SMITHERMAN,

EDUCATrNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES: DETROIT'S MALCOLM X ACADEMY SOLUTION
Detroit Board Agrees To Let Girls Attend Male-Only Academies, SCH. L. NEWS,

49 (1996);
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the appropriate constitutional status of schools like this under
Virginia's framework, a Court could usefully explore the possibility
that whether, when,. why, and how a sex-segregated public school de
prives women of "full citizenship stature" may differ depending on the
race, class, or other characteristics of the women at issue.148
B.

Sepa ration Is Not t he Only Mechanismfor D en ying Women "Full
Citizen ship" an d Maintaining Their "Inferiority": The Historical
Overla p B etween Sex-Segregated and Coeducational Pub lic Education

The historical record of sex-segregated (and coeducational) public
education also reveals that separation of the sexes is not the only
mechanism through which women's "full citizenship" can be denied
and their "inferiority" maintained}49 Currently, the sex discrimination
jurisprudence, even in Virginia, focuses narrowly on separation. State
action, like sex-segregated public education, that openly distinguishes
or divides men and women is automatically subject to heightened scru
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause. But facially neutral state ac
tion, like coeducational public education, is subject to heightened scru
tiny only if the plaintiff can meet the extraordinarily difficult burden
of demonstrating the equivalent of official malice: "that the decision
maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon"
women or men.150 This rule all but ignores coeducational public
schools as potential sources of women's inequality, and appears to as
sume that single-sex and coeducational public education are vastly dif
ferent.
·

Aug. 29, 1991, at 5, 5; Laurel Shaper Walters, The Plight of Black Male Schools, CHRISTIAN
Set. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8, 8. These schools have pursued an Afrocentric curriculum.
See·Wf!-.TSON & SMITHERMAN, supra, at 55 ("The mission of the Malcolm X Academy grows
out of its grounding in the pedagogy that has come to be known as 'African Immersion,' or
'Afrocentricity.'"); Kevin Bushweller, Separate by Choice, AM . SCH. BOARD J., Oct. 1996, at
'
34, 36 ("In the classroom [at Detroit's Malcolm X Academy], a red, green, and black flag of
African-American nationalism serves as yet another reminder of the intensely racial focus of
this school.','). There is also some evidence that the schools' primary focus remains on male
students. See WATSON & SMITHERMAN, supra, at 24 ("Despite Judge Woods' ruling, today
in 1994, the Detroit Public Schools' original 'Male Academy' concept continues virtually in
full force. All three of Detroit's first African-Centered Academies have annually had a stu
dent population that is 90% or more Black male.''); Bushweller, supra, at 34 ("Even though
15 ·percent of the students (at Detroit's Malcolm X Academy] are now girls, the school's
primary mission remains helping young black males, says the school's principal, Clifford
Watson.").
L48.

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.

149. Id. at 532, 534.
150. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (rejecting equal protection chal
lenge to Massachusetts veterans' preference statute because "nothing in the record demon
strates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted
because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and pre
defined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service").
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The focus on separation in the sex discrimination jurisprudence
may reflect that case law's frequent reliance on analogies to race dis
crimination.151 The mechanism of separation has figured very promi
nently in the history of race in the United States. The very fact that
whites and blacks were kept apart, in school and especially in relations
of intimacy, appears to have been among the most important means
through which white supremacy was expressed and enforced. Recall,
for instance, the many school districts that were convinced that one of
the most effective ways they could preserve racial hierarchy after
B rown was by separating black boys from white girls.152 This is not to
say that white supremacy has always been maintained through the
mechanism of separation. One important historical expression of
white privilege, for instance, was the legal protection that white men
enjoyed in seeking sexual access to black women.153 But in general, the
history of race discrimination often focuses our attention on .separa
tion as the means by which unequal citizenship and legalized inferior
ity can be sustained.
The history of sex-segregated and coeducational public education,
however, helps us see another powerful mechanism by which "full citi
zenship" can be denied and "legal, social, and economic inferiority"
preserved.154 This mechanism might be called "sex role confinement."
One common feature .of the practice of sex-segregated public educa
tion through at least the mid-part of the twentieth century, one way it
functioned to deny equal status to even the elite white women most
privileged by the system, was by steering women toward marriage,
motherhood, and a small number of poorly compensated jobs, and
leaving them without the resources to make any other choices. This
had dignitary consequences; it was premised on the view that women
were not suited to assume a prominent part in the nation's public or
economic life. It also caused women to suffer real material harm by
depriving them of the training and connections that they needed to
pursue such opportunities.
This role confinement, however, did not depend on separation. In
fact, it was evident in approximately equal degree in the coeducational
public schools of the period. Coeducational public schools brought the
sexes together, but they maintained role differentiation and confine
ment and a focus on educating women for marriage and maternity.
Sex-segregated public schools, in tum, separated students by sex, yet
always operated on the premise that men's and women's lives were in
timately intertwined.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 136-142.
153. See supra text accompanying note 138.
154. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534.
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This feature of the historical record can inform an inquiry into the
appropriate constitutional regulation of sex-segregated public educa
tion under Virginia's framework in at least three ways. First, this rec
ord suggests that it would be wise for a Court deciding whether to ab
solutely prohibit sex-segregated public schooling-a question the
Court has been unable to resolve-to compare the practice of sex
segregated public education to that of coeducational public education.
Presumably, a Court would be unwilling to find coeducational public
schooling categorically unconstitutional. But as we will discover, the
historical record reveals that differences of form like that between sex
segregated and coeducational public education can actually prove
relatively unimportant in terms of their substantive impact on
women's status. If the two forms of public education are operating
with equal effect to maintain women's unequal status, moreover, it is
difficult to see why a constitutional jurisprudence determined to pro
tect women's equal citizenship would want to draw such an absolute.
line based on the form of public education, or how prohibiting all
single-sex public schools and having all public school students attend
coeducational institutions would further women's "full citizenship
stature" or combat their "inferiority."155 At the least, the case would
need to be made.
Second, this record suggests that if sex-segregated public education
is not found categorically unconstitutional under Virginia's frame
work, a Court deciding what constitutional regulations would best
prevent single-sex public schools from operating to deny women equal
status should consider the potential problem of role confinement. Re
quiring single-sex public schools to comply with separate but equal
standards, moreover, may not necessarily be sufficient to counter this
problem. Women's public schools, for example, have historically been
underfunded compared to men's public schools.156 But it is not at all
clear what equal funding would have done to stop the system of sex
segregated public education from steering women toward marriage
and maternity and away from any alternate or additional life paths.
Indeed, as we will see, the history of coeducational public education
vividly illustrates that this kind of role confinement can flourish even
in schools where female and male students officially have access to the
same resources and the same curriculum.

155. ld.
156. In the 1901-1902 school year, for example, Louisville, Kentucky devoted more
money to its white high school students than it spent on the Central Colored High School,
which was coeducational and received $41.35 per student. See Reports of the Louisville
School Board for the Years 1901-1902 and 1902-1903, supra note 128, at 247. But the city also
spent much more on the high schools for white boys ($99.42 per student at the Manual
Training High School and $71.03 per student at the Male High School), than it spent on the
high school for white girls {$41.75 per student at the Female High School). See id.

December 2002]

Women's "Full Citizenship"

795

Third, this historical record suggests that a Court determined to
safeguard women's "full citizenship" and fight their "inferiority"
would be well-advised to focus much more constitutional scrutiny on
coeducational public schools directly, examining them as potential
sources of women's unequal status that may require more regulation
for that reason.157 This last point is one that the Court may be espe
cially unlikely to pursue. Virginia, after all, expresses no willingness to
extend its reasoning to facially neutral state action. But the historical
record explored here could also inform a legislative inquiry into how
best to regulate coeducational public education so that it does not de
prive women of "full citizenship stature" or "create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women. "158
In Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, for example,
Congress prohibited schools that receive federal funding from dis
criminating based on sex.159 This statute provides Congress with a rela
tively straightforward means of reaching a vast array of institutions
sex-segregated and coeducational. As it now stands, Title IX's only
relationship to history appears in a provision that privileges sex
segregated public colleges if they participated in the historical practice
of sex segregation. Title IX denies funding to sex-segregated voca
tional schools, professional schools, graduate schools, and public col
leges. 160 But it permits funding to go to sex-segregated public colleges
that have "traditionally and continually" excluded students of one
sex.161 It is not clear why a statute concerned with combating sex dis
crimination should favor public colleges that have long been sex
segregated; the historical practice of sex-segregated public education
in the United States was entangled in the maintenance of women's
unequal citizenship. Yet the historical record does suggest that
Congress's concern under Title IX could usefully extend beyond the
question of sex segregation. Most notably, Congress could usefully
devote particular attention to the potential problem (in both coeduca
tional and single-sex public schools) of role confinement.
Let's examine the record.
The practice of sex-segregated public education as it existed in the
United States through at least the middle of the twentieth century was
systematically structured to direct women to marriage, motherhood,
and a narrow range of low-wage, low-status market work, and to re-

157. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534.
158. Id.
159. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 235, 373
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)).
160. See id § 901(a)(l).
161. Id. § 901(a)(5).
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strict women's opportunities for prominent participation in economic
or political affairs. This was accomplished in several different ways.
Some of the strategies were located in the women's public schools.
A number of these schools were designed to prepare women for
female-dominated employment characterized by poor pay and little
chance of advancement. The women's public high schools in Boston
and Philadelphia,162 for instance, trained women for public school
teaching, a job category that was becoming increasingly occupied by
women as its wages and status declined.163 Other institutions trained
their students for traditionally female jobs associated with even less
money and prestige. The public high school for white women in
Louisville, Kentucky, for example, offered its students a class "'in
Vocational Cooking,"' '"designed to prepare a girl for lunch-room
management, catering, etc."'164

162. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
163. In 1890, women constituted 65.5% of all teachers in the public elementary and high
schools of the United States. This figure rose to 70.1 % in 1900, 78.9% in 1910, and 85.9% in
1920. See FRANK M. PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BULL. NO. 38, STATISTICAL
SURVEY OF EDUCATION, 1921-1922, at 4 tbl.5 (1925). On the almost universal practice of
paying women teachers much less than their male counterparts, see, for example, JOEL
PERLMANN & ROBERT A. MARGO, WOMEN'S WORK?: AMERICAN SCHOOLTEACHERS,
1650-1920, at 33 (2001) {"In New York state, in the mid-1840s, women's wages averaged
$5.55 in the summer session and $6.98 in the winter session, while men received $13.61 and
$14.06 respectively, producing female-to-male wage ratios of 0.425 for the summer and 0.496
for the winter session."); id. at 116, 117 tbl.5.1 ("We have . . . collected teacher lists from
three cities: Grand Rapids, Michigan [from 1880 to 1903]; Portland, Oregon [from 1878 to
1906]; and Paterson, New Jersey [from 1875 to 1910] . . . . The lowest ratio of female-to-male
salaries occurred in Paterson: there female personnel were paid, on average, 42 cents for
every dollar earned by male personnel. The salary ratio was a bit higher in Grand Rapids
(0.47) and significantly greater in Portland (0.55) . . . . "); Horace Mann, Eleventh Annual
Report of the Secretary of the Board of Education, in ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, TOGETHER WITH THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 21 , 26 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1848) ("Now, the average
wages of male teachers [in Massachusetts], last year, inclusive of their board, was $32 46, and
the average wages of female teachers, also inclusive of board, was $13 60 . . . . Such is the
economy of employing female teachers, whom the Normal Schools have done so much, and
are capable of doing so much more, to qualify."); Keith E. Melder, Woman's High Calling:
The Teaching Profession in America, 1830-1860, 13 A M . STUD. 19, 22 (1972) ("Connecticut
in 1838 . . . paid men exclusive of board $14.50 per month, women $5.75. In Ashtabula
County, Ohio, the average male wage was recorded as $14 per month, while females took
home $1.25 each week. In the same year Massachusetts school returns indicated . . . an aver
age salary of $23.10 a month for men, $6.49 for women, excluding board. Pennsylvania . . .
recorded wages of $18.50 per month for males, $11.30 for females."); Jo Anne Preston,
Feminization of an Occupation: Teaching Becomes Women's Work in Nineteenth-Century
New England 36 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with
author) ("The average female summer wages for ten selected Massachusetts towns [in 18331834] . . . were one-third to one-half of the average male wages. Although there existed sub
stantial differences in wage ratios between towns, the women's average wage was never
more than 50% of the male average in any particular town.").
164. Winifred Richmond, Present Practices and Tendencies in the Secondary Education
of Girls, 23 PEDAGOGICAL SEMINARY 184, 187 (1916) (quoting "[a] recent letter from the
principal"); see also Dora Wells, The Lucy Flower Technical High School, 22 SCH. REV. 61 1,
611, 614 (1914) ("If a girl [at the Lucy L. Flower Technical High School for girls in Chicago]
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Sometimes, moreover, women's public schools just trained women
for marriage itself. Louisville's Female High, School, for instance, did
not offer the college preparatory classes available to the city's white
male high school students.165 But it did supplement its class in
vocational cooking with courses in household cooking, drawing, sew
ing, and millinery.166. Similarly, the Board of· Commissioners for the
public schools of Baltimore provided no college preparation at its high
schools for white girls. As it explained, these female students were "in
preparation for a different sphere of life," in which " [t]he circle of
their operations" would "be circumscribed by the domestic relations,"
so that women remained outside "the arena of public action" and "in
the quiet seclusion of home."167 The president of the Mississippi
Industrial Institute and College described his institution in related
terms in 1887, reporting that the school was "'not teaching woman to
demand the 'rights' of men nor to invade the sphere of men."'168
Instead, the women's college was training its female students "'for the
ways of modest usefulness, for works of true benevolence,"' which
would invest them '"with that true womanly cµaracter and those beau
tiful Christian graces that constitute [woman] the charm of social life
and the queen of home."'169 The chairman of the Board of Trustees for
the Winthrop Normal and Industrial College,170 a public school for

finds that her interest lies in cookery she may fit herself to'assist in managing a lunchroom or
an institutional kitchen or may make a beginning at general catering.").
165. See LEWIS, supra note 107, at 349 ("The course of the [female high] school is very
similar to that of the male high school, but substitutes for Greek something in the way of
what is usually denominated ornamental education."); see also REPORT OF THE MALE HIGH
SCHOOL LOUISVILLE, KY. FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR 1907-08, at 1 5 (1908) ("Our graduates
are in Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, and many other institutions, where they have
entered without a condition . . . . About fifty per cent of the graduating class usually goes ei
ther to a scientific, classical, law or medical college.").
166. See Richmond, supra note 164, at 1 87 (quoting '\(a] recent letter from the princi
pal").
167. THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, TO THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BA LTIMORE 84 (Baltimore, Bull &
Tuttle 1860); see also Baltimore Public Schools, supra note 105, at 103 (noting that "the
modern foreign languages, with Greek and Latin, are omitted in the female high schools" of
Baltimore).
168. MAYES, supra note 126, at 252 (quoting report of President Richard W. Jones to
the Board of Trustees (Dec. 1887)).
169. Id. (quoting report of President Richard W. Jones to the Board of Trustees (Dec.
1887)); see also George Duke H umphrey, Public Education for Whites in Mississippi, 3 J.
MISS. HIST. 26, 32 (1941) ("During the first fifteen years [of the Mississippi Industrial
Institute and College], many of the courses in tlie college departme!}t were on a high school
level.").
·

170. See LA YING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF THE WINTHROP NORMAL AND
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AT ROCK HILL, S.C. MAY 12, 1894 THE
EIGHTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF HON. ROBERT c. WINTHROP 14 (Lancaster, Enterprise
Publishing Co. n.d.).
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white women in South Carolina,171 echoed these sentiments in 1894.
As he assured the audience at the ceremony for laying Winthrop's
cornerstone, '"[w]oman's special province in life is that of a home
maker."'172 "'It is to fit women to be mothers-high, noble, properly
trained mothers, the natural and proper guardians of children, that
this school is founded. "'173 The ' school would '"never send forth or
harbor one of these 'horrid' creatures,'"174 the '"strong minded, bold,
brazen, pert, self-asserting female, prating of 'woman's rights,' 'man's
tyranny and selfishness,' the 'degradation of nursing children,' and so
on, ad n auseam. "' 115
These same structuring principles were visible in women's public
schools outside the South as well. For instance, at the Wadleigh High
School for Girls, a public school in New York City,176 students had no
opportunity to take classes in Latin or Greek, often crucial for college
admission in the period. But pupils were required to take two years
each of " [d]omestic science and domestic art," and one year each of
"'household arithmetic,"' "hygiene and sanitation, household
management, 'social efficiency,' and 'essentials of conduct."'177 At the
Lucy L. Flower Technical High School, a public women's school in
Chicago,178 " [t]he two years of required study of the arts of home
making . . . rest[ed] upon belief in the imperative necessity of training
girls for the profession of homemaker."179 The principal of the William
Penn High School, a public women's school in Philadelphia,180 was
similarly convinced that " [t]he most fundamental of all functions of
woman is that of motherhood. But the instincts that make her play
house, tend dolls, and sacrifice for her children need to be educated
and trained before she can do her best in the bearing and rearing of
the race."181
171. See supra note 117.
172. LAYING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF THE WINTHROP NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL
COLLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AT ROCK HILL, S.C. MAY 12, 1894 THE EIGHTY-FIFTH
BIRTHDAY OF HON. ROBERT c. WINTHROP, supra note 170, at 26 (quoting introductory
address of Governor Tillman).
173. Id. (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
174. Id. at 28 (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
175. Id. at 27 (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
176. See Modern Ideas Followed in Building New High School, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1 ,
1903, a t 28, 28; R.K., Old School: Famous, Infamous and Now a Landmark, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 1994, § 13, at 6, 6.
177. BENJAMIN R. ANDREWS, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION, BULL. NO. 37,
EDUCATION FOR THE HOME 96 (1914).
178. See Wells, supra note 164, at 611.
179. Id. at 614.
180. See 21 THE ENCYCLOP!EDIA BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES,
LITERATURE AND GENERAL INFORMATION 369-70 (11th ed. 1911).
181. WILLIAM D. LEWIS, DEMOCRACY'S HIGH SCHOOL 68 (Henry Suzzallo ed., 1914).
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Of course, it was not the case that employers in this era were anx
ious to hire women for a wide array of remunerative and rewarding
occupations, or that society in general was eager to smooth women's
path to securing economic and political power. But there is a persis
tent tendency in legal and popular discourse, evident in some of the
modern jurisprudence on sex-segregated public education and visible
in many other arenas as well,182 to explain the positions that women
have occupied as the products purely of custom and tradition, long
agreed to by women and men alike. Yet it was not simply custom and
social expectations that functioned to confine women to relatively few
life paths. Women's public schools, created and run by states, locali
ties, and laws, pushed women toward a narrowly defined set of roles,
without providing them with the resources and tools that they needed
to pursue other paths. These schools helped to create expectations
about women's life choices and possibilities, to enforce them, and to
make their consequences more powerful and important.
The customs and expectations about women's roles that did exist,
moreover� were hardly uncontested. Public jurisdictions in the nine
teenth and twentieth centuries prevented women from entering men's
public schools, in the face of women's determined efforts to win ad
mission. Indeed, women's exclusion from many of the public schools
that prepared men for privileged participation in political and eco
nomic life was probably at least as important a factor in maintaining
the disabling effects of sex-segregated public education for women, as
any feature of the women's public schools.
This exclusion inflicted injuries on women that were both dignitary
and material: The men's public schools repeatedly declared that
women were unsuited for professional and political success and never
would or should attain it, and simultaneously denied women the re
sources required to pursue such opportunities. In 1858, for instance, a
group of women attempted to gain admission to the University of
Michigan, the most prominent public university in the Midwest.183 The
182.
183.

See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.

In March of 1858, Sarah Burger notified the University of Michigan's Board of
Regents that she and eleven other women would be applying for admission in the coming
June. See UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, REGENTS' PROCEEDINGS WITH APPENDIXES AND
INDEX, 1837-1864, at 732 (1915) (Mar. 25, 1858) ("A communication was received from Miss
Sarah E. Burger stating that a class of 12 young ladies would present themselves for admis
sion as students in the University in June next. Laid on the table."); 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 526-27 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Ayer Co. 1985) (1886). Burger, a
young secondary school student living in Ann Arbor, had organized this group after a
woman's rights convention left her convinced "'that the Michigan University as well as all
others, should be opened to girls, and that women themselves should first move in the mat
ter."' Id. at 527 (quoting Sarah Burger). Burger and her allies promptly applied for admis
sion in June. See UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, supra, at 743 (June 22, 1858) ("A communica
tion was received from Miss S.J. Burger and Miss H.A. Patton of Ann Arbor, asking for
admission to the University. A similar request was received from Miss. A.J. Chapin, of
Lansing.").
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school rejected the women's applications,184 stressing the broad con
sensus it had found among leading male educators
That an University contemplates the education of candidates for profes
sional and public life , which is not the end of female education. That a
different end requires different means; that the effects of such a system
upon young ladies would proba}?ly be to give them false ideas of life in
general and of their particular sphere, than which nothing could be more
injurious in the forming stage of character. That young men would be
likely to lose in a corresponding ratio in proper sense of the dignity of
their own pursuits.185

Similarly, a group of women in the 1910s campaigned for the es
tablishment of a white women's coordinate college at the University of
Virginia, the leading public university in the South.186 This college
would not have operated coeducational classes or educational pro
grams,187 which the University of Virginia had rejected vehemently in
the past,188 but it would have given white women access to the flagship

184. Specifically, the Michigan Regents
Resolved, That to adapt the University to the education of both sexes would require such a
revolution in the management and conduct of the Institution that we think it wiser, under all
the circumstances both in respect to the interests of the University and the interests of the
young ladies, that their application should not be granted and that at present it is inexpedi
ent to introduce this change into the Institution.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, supra note 183, at 759 (Sept. 29, 1858).
185. Id. at 788 (Report on the Admission of Females, Submitted September 29, 1 858).
186. Mary-Cooke Branch Munford organized the first systematic campaign to win white
women's admission to the University of Virginia in 1910, establishing the "Coordinate
College League" and recruiting a dedicated core of volunteers. See, e.g., Letter from Mary
Cooke Branch Munford, Coordinate College League, to E.A. Alderman, University of
Virginia 1 (Dec. 15, 1915) (on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia);
WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE, SUNRISE IN THE SOUTH: THE LIFE OF MARY-COOKE BRANCH
MUNFORD 107 (1 942).
187. The very word '"co-education,"' '"next to Woman's Suffrage,"' was enough, a
prominent member of the Coordinate College League once explained, to leave Virginia's
legislators "'scared . . . to death."' BOWIE, supra note 1 86, at 140 (quoting Letter from Mrs.
Norman Randolph to Mary-Cooke Branch Munford (1914)).
188. In 1894, for instance, the Virginia faculty and the university's Board of Visitors
emphatically rebuffed a faculty committee's recommendation that the school accept female
students on the same terms as men. See 13 University of Virginia, Minutes of the Faculty
384, 386 (May 12, 1894) (on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia); 6
University of Virginia, Minutes of the Rector and Board of Visitors 379-81 (June 11, 1894)
(on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia). The faculty members who
supported women's exclusion predicted that admitting female students to the University of
Virginia would undermine "[t)he exalted position which matrons and daughters have long
held and still hold in our social organization," explaining that "[t)he scheme of coeducation
strikes at the very root of this prized form of society, and tends to subvert what we cherish as
most excellent in our homes." 13 University of Virginia, Minutes of the Faculty 417 (June 4,
1894) (on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia). Women who attended
the University of Virginia would, they warned, "become familiar, boisterous, bold in man
ners, often rudely aggressive, and ambitiously competitive with men, thus producing, in gen
eral, a type of womanhood from which we devoutly pray to be spared." Id. at 416.
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university's faculty, library, laboratories, and other resources.189 The
Virginia legislature, however, refused to open even a coordinate col
lege for white women at the University of Virginia.1?0 As one male ac
tivist against the coordinate college explained, "higher education un
fits [woman] for domestic employment."191 Admitting women to the
University of Virginia, another man similarly warned, would be "quite
tragical," for it would lead women to "imagine that they will be per
manently superior to the callow class mates surpassed by them in col
lege; and so plan lives tending to independence of and competition
with men."192
Historical accounts of the rise of coeducation in public education
often envision coeducation as an important break from the patterns
established in sex-segregated education.193 Yet the two forms of public
189. See, e.g. , Mary C.B. Munford & Virginia S. McKenney, A Plea for Co-Ordination, 7
ALUMNI BULL. U. VA . 4, 6-7, 9 (1914). The League's arguments in favor of its plan were
accordingly able to stress its relative moderation. Indeed, the League very deliberately
attempted to win allies among the many powerful opponents of coeducation in Virginia by
characterizing the coordinate college as a Jess radical means of diffusing women's protests.
" [C]o-education," the League warned, "will be inevitable, unless Virginia women are given
opportunities absolutely equal to those affo rded Virginia men." CO-ORDINATE COLLEGE
LEAGUE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WHY A CO-ORDINATE COLLEGE AT CHARLOTTESVILLE
AFFILIATED WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA RATHER THAN A SEPARATE COLLEGE 6
(n.d.).
1 90. Munford and her League had the support and the political skills needed to prod the
legislature, which met every other year, into considering their proposal at five consecutive
sessions starting in 1910. See A lmost a Victory, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 11, 1914, at 5, 5; Co
Ordinate Bill Wins in Senate by Big Majority, TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond), Mar. 11, 1914,
at 1, 1; Orie Latham Hatcher, The Virginia Man and the New Era for Women, 106 NATION
650, 651 (1918); House Postpones College Measure, TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond), Jan. 21,
1912, at 1 , l ; House Rejects Woman's College Bill, 48 to 46, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 8, 1916, at l, l; Lewis H. Machen, The Woman's College, TIMES DISPATCH
(Richmond), Jan. 21, 1912, at 4, 4. But they Jacked the political power, and the legal rights,
necessary to win their campaign. In 1916, the League came as close to victory as it ever
would. The Virginia Senate passed a bill that year to establish a coordinate college, which
failed in the Virginia House by only two votes. See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, SESSION WHICH COMMENCED AT THE STATE CAPITOL ON
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1916, at 947-48 (1916) (Mar. 7, 1916); House Rejects Woman 's
College Bill, 48 to 46, supra, at 1; Open Letter from Mary-Cooke Branch Munford,
Chairman Central Committee, Coordinate College League 1 (Mar. 14, 1916) (on file with
author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia).
191. Edwin F. Surber, The Education of Women, TIMES D ISPATCH (Richmond), Jan. 16,
1914, at 4, 4.
192. Letter from Arthur Lefrin to J.M. Page, University of Virginia 2 (Aug. 1 4, 1914)
(on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia).
193. Carl Degler, for instance, stresses what he calls "the decision to include girls in
primary and secondary schooling on a par with boys." Carl N. Degler, What the Women's
Movement Has Done to American History, in A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY:
THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES 67, 74 (Elizabeth Langland & Walter Gove eds., 1981). Simi
larly, Thomas Woody's classic history of women's education explains that:
Any wide acceptance of coeducation in practice had obviously to wait upon more general
approval of the idea that girls should have more than rudimentary education. Hence the first
academies and high schools, insofar as they promoted the educational interests of women,
had to do it on the separate plan. The high schools, once under way, soon changed, however,
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schooling were much closer in function and effect than one might ini
tially suppose and has frequently been assumed. Coeducation became
the dominant form of public education in the United States by the late
nineteenth century, but not because most public jurisdictions were
committed to providing women with the same life choices, prospects,
and possibilities open to men. To the contrary, the decisionmakers and
advocates behind coeducational public schools were often explicitly
determined to maintain and enforce sex roles that confined women to
marriage and motherhood and directed men to economic and political
success.
The practicalities of organizing a status regime can affect how it
develops and can cause it to change in form. Segregating public insti
tutions is necessarily an expensive proposition, unless jurisdictions are
willing to exclude one group completely.194 In this case, the cost of sexand became chiefly coeducational. They benefitted by the great faith in girls' education that
was gradually built up by the seminaries from the middle of the eighteenth to the middle of
the nineteenth centuries. Believing in equal education for their sons and daughters, commu
nities began to seek an institution to offer it.
2 THOMAS WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 228
(1929); see also HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, ALMA MATER: DESIGN AND EXPERIENCE
IN THE WOMEN'S COLLEGES FROM THEIR NINETEENTH-CENTURY BEGINNINGS TO THE
1930s, at 85-86 (1984) ("As one of the early women graduates of the University of
Michigan . . . , Alice Freeman had experienced the unique independence of that pioneer
coeducational university. In the first years of coeducation, the university allowed women the
complete freedom of men, letting them attend all classes (except in the Medical College) and
live in boarding houses without supervision."). For an example of the influence of this
historical view in the legal literature, see Morgan, supra note 80, at 386 ("[B)y the 1890s it
was widely accepted that schools should offer essentially the same curriculum to both boys
and girls and educate children of both sexes together.").
194. Some historians, for example, have suggested that southern states in the late nine
teenth century may have passed laws requiring racial segregation in public transportation in
part because they recognized that railroad lines, steamboat operators, and other common
carriers were not consistently willing to bear the expense of providing wholly separate ac
commodations for whites and blacks unless compelled to do so by legislation. See Welke,
supra note 131 , at 266-67 ("[Case] law and their own financial interest led carriers to allow
respectable women of color to ride in first-class ladies' accommodations. By the late 1880s
and early 1890s it had become clear that the wall guarding Southern white woman's sacred
place-and hence white supremacy-was not secure in the hands of carriers and courts.
Southern state legislatures quickly moved to impose absolute racial separation first on rail
roads and then on other carriers not only to control the region's black population, but also to
force common carriers and Southern courts into line."); id. at 312 ("Those in power in the
South adopted statutory Jim Crow beginning in the 1890s because . . . [in ter alia] carriers in
allowing respectable black women to ride in first-class ladies' accommodations were them
selves failing to protect the purity of white womanhood. Seen in this light, the shift to statu
tory Jim Crow not only was necessary to control Southern blacks, but also to force common
carriers . . . into line.").
In the first half of the twentieth century, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) recognized that southern states and localities were able to af
ford racially segregated public institutions only because they spent so few resources on the
schools and other public facilities for African-Americans. One early strategy that the
NAACP devised was to bankrupt these southern jurisdictions through litigation that actually
forced them to comply with rigorous separate but equal standards in their segregated institu
tions. See MARK v. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1 936-1961, at 12-13 (1994); see also id. at 117 ("In 1941 the United
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segregated schooling importantly drove the rjse of public coeducation.
For jurisdictions, like those in the South and Northeast, intent on us
ing sex segregation in public education as an exprt?ssion of racial or
economic privilege, as well as gender status, sex segregation repre
sented money well spent.195 But for states, cities, and towns not as in
terested in reinforcing race or class divides in their public educational
systems, sex segregation was often too expensive and too elaborate an
expression of gender norms.196 These jurisdictions could easily struc
ture their coeducational schools to maintain men's and women's status
in virtually the same way that sex-segregated public ins�itutions did,
without having to bear the cost of complete sex segregation.
Like their single-sex counterparts, coeducational public schools
employed a number of different mechanisms. Sometimes, coeduca
tional public schools formally segregated a portion of their classes or
programs along_ sex lines as a way of directing students to life paths as
sociated with their sex (or their sex and race) and keeping them from
resources and opportunities that might have made deviation more
States Office of Education reported that it would cost the South about $26 million a year to
equalize teachers' salaries, and another $9 million to equalize student-teacher ratios in black
and white schools.").

195. Many state universities south of the Mason-Dixon line and east of the Mississippi
River were sex-segregated in this period. In 1907, for example, only the Universities of
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia admitted
both men and women. See Charles R. Van Hise, Educational Tendencies in State Universities,
34 EDUC. REV. 504, 511 (1907). A federal survey conducted in 1882 found that 19 out of 196
cities and large towns were operating sex-segregated public schools. See U.S. BUREAU OF
EDUCATION, CIRCULAR OF INFORMATION NO. 2-1883, COEDUCATION OF THE SEXES IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (Washington, Government Printing
Office 1883). The nineteen jurisdictions were heavily concentrated in the South and
Northeast: Mobile, Alabama; Wilmington, Delaware; Macon, Georgia; Belleville, Illinois;
New Orleans, Louisiana; Baltimore, Maryland; Marblehead, Massachusetts; Newburyport,
Massachusetts; Vicksburg, Mississippi; New Brunswick, New Jersey; Brooklyn, New York;
Allentown, Pennsylvania; Easton, Pennsylvania; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; York,
Pennsylvania; Charleston, South Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee; Austin, Texas; and
Alexandria, Virginia. See id. at 24; see also Richmond, supra note 164, at 185 ("In 1914,
according to the Commissioner's report, there were 28 of these (public women's high]
schools, which were distributed as follows: Massachusetts, 4; New York, 4; Pennsylvania, 5;
Maryland, 4; South Carolina, 1; Georgia, 4; Louisiana, 2; Kentucky, 1; Illinois, 1; and
California, 2. The total number of girls in these schools was 34,362. The two States of New
York and Pennsylvania have over 60 per cent. of the entire number, while if we include
Massachusetts and Maryland the four have over 80 per cent.").
196. The economic motivations behind admitting women to schools with men are easiest
to see in the public universities of the Midwest, where the traditions of sex segregation were
less entrenched than in the East or South but still stronger than in the developing West. As
the University of Wisconsin's president later explained, "[t]he western states in these early
days were too poor to support two high-grade educational institutions." Van Hise, supra
note 195, at 509. There was no way to provide women with access to public higher education
"but to adopt coeducation, and this was the solution which was gradually forced upon the
older state universities of the middle west." Id. If nothing else, one president of the
University of Iowa also reasoned, "then one strong plea may be made for coeducational
colleges on the score of economy. Duplication of all essential equipments . . . can hardly be
justified." J.L. Pickard, Coeducation in Colleges, 13 EDUC. 259, 265-66 (1893).
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possible. In the early twentieth century, for instance, the University of
California at Berkeley barred female students from admission to Phi
Beta Kappa, the most prestigious academic honor society, reasoning
that '"when it came to finding a good job, men needed the help of this
honor more than women did."'197 With a similar division of life roles in
mind, Marinette, Wisconsin's coeducational public high school began
segregating its classes in physics and chemistry by sex in 1912. As the
superintendent of the city's schools explained, the physics and chemis
try classes limited to male students were "'technical and mathemati
cal"' and ""scientific,"" deliberately designed to prepare men for
'"scientific and engineering courses in the colleges and universities"'
and careers '"in the arts and industries."' In contrast, '"[t]he course in
physics given to the girls' classes [was] largely informational and cul
tural and less technical."' The only chemistry classes open to female
students, in turn, were "'built up largely around the chemistry of the
home, of cooking, food values, and adulterations and their detec
tion. "'198
197. Lillian Moller Gilbreth, in THERE WAS LIGHT: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
UNIVERSITY, BERKELEY: 1868-1968, at 83, 84-85 (Irving Stone ed., 1970); see also id. at 449
(providing biographical information about Gilbreth). In 1916, Oscar M. Voorhees, the secre
tary of Phi Beta Kappa's National Council, proposed altering the organization's rules to
make it more difficult for female college students to gain admission. As he explained, elec
tion to Phi Beta Kappa was determined "on the basis of grades only." Oscar M. Voorhees,
Proceedings of the Twelfth National Council, 3 PH I BETA KAPPA KEY 8, 20 (1916). Under
this system, however, "the number of undergraduate women elected nearly equaled the
number of men," and "[m]any chapters elect[ed] each year more women than men." Id.
Voorhees was concerned that "some of our chapters" did not have "the highest reputation
by reason of the preponderance of women," and concluded that "election on the basis of
grades only has . . . been pushed to the extreme." Id. As he reasoned, "[t]he way must be
kept open to the men, and promising students be encouraged to seek membership. In my
opinion there are other marks in undergraduates of the promise of usefulness than mere
grades." Id. Phi Beta Kappa's president quickly appointed a committee to study the matter.
See id. at 33-34.
198. U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION, BULL. NO. 31, SPECIAL FEATURES IN CITY
SCHOOL SYSTEMS 52 (1913) (quoting G.H. Landgraf, superintendent of city schools). The
Broadway High School in Seattle, Washington also segregated some of its science classes by
sex, along with some of its classes in English, math, history, Latin, French, Spanish, German,
commercial work, and manual training. See Thomas R. Cole, Segregation at the Broadway
High School, Seattle, 23 SCH . REV. 550, 551 tbl.I {1915). One teacher, who approved of the
arrangement, explained its advantages this way in 1915:
In physics, I have been able to leave out much of the most difficult part for the girls and do
more extensive work in the parts in which they are naturally most interested. The work of
the boys has been made to include a great deal that I have never found time to touch in
mixed classes. I would say that boys have done 30 to 40 per cent more work than in mixed
classes. The brighter girls have probably lost the fund of outside information, applications,
etc., that the boys contribute to the recitation.

Id. at 553; see also Richmond, supra note 164, at 187 (reporting in 1916 that sex-segregated
classes operated in coeducational public schools "in Seattle, Washington; in Fresno,
California; in Muskogee, Oklahoma; in Richmond, Indiana; the Englewood High School, in
Chicago; the high schools in Columbus, Ohio, and in Hackensack, New Jersey, the Junior
High School in Clinton, Iowa" and noting that "[o]f these 8 schools, 4 separate the classes in
science; 3 in physiology, physical culture, and manual training, either through all or a part of
the course; 2 separate in drawing").
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Sex-segregated home economics classes in coeducational public
schools were also particularly notable for pushing female students to
ward home and family, while simultaneously reflecting a particular de
termination to train black women for domestic service. The public
school system in Long Beach, California, for instance, began requiring
all female high school students in 1927 to take "a course in home man
agement" that featured the "Study of the job of homemaking as a vo
cation for women."199 A 1929 study of public high schools in eleven
southern states fo und that thirty percent of the surveyed schools re
quired female students to enroll in home economics courses.200 A sur
vey of the black public high schools operating in ten southern states
during the 1930-1931 school year found that as many as eighty-five
percent of them had required home economics classes for female stu
dents.201
Often, however, coeducational public schools did not officially
limit a class or program to students of one sex, but utilized a variety of
other means that were approximately as effective at steering female
students toward some courses, opportunities, and life paths, and away
from others. For instance, one strategy that many coeducational public
colleges and universities employed was to establish home economics
departments. By 1905, thirty-six of the land-grant colleges, practically
every one in the North and West, had such a department.202 These de199. Maud E. Hayes et al., Budgets in a Home Management Course for a Senior High
School, 20 J. HOME ECON. 75, 75-76 (1928); see also MARION TALBOT, THE EDUCATION OF
WOMEN 152-53 (1910) ("[I]n the Chicago Public Schools in December, 1909. . . . [a]ll girls in
the elementary schools have either domestic science or domestic arts as a requirement fo r
graduation.").
200. See Rosaline Ivey, Status of Home Economics in Certain Southern Accredited
High Schools 3-6, 23 (1929) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Peabody College for
Teachers) (on file with author).
201. See Ruth Aline Patton, A Study of Home Economics in Some Negro High Schools
5-7, 26-27, 55 (1931) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Peabody College for Teachers) (on
file with author); see also TwENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
LABOR, 1910: INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION 131-33 (1911) ("(At the Armstrong Manual
Training School, a public high school for African-American students in Washington, D.C.,]
the boys uniformly (take] woodwork . . . in the first year and forging in the second year. The
girls do plain sewing and dressmaking in the first year and dressmaking only in the second
year . . . . The laundry department prepares the girls to do scientific laundry work, while the
course in domestic science fits them for domestic service as well as for home duties. lt is said
that a number of the girls go into domestic service upon graduation."); Kate Brew Vaughn,
Some Colored Schools of the South, 8 J. HOME ECON. 588, 588 (1916) ("Eight years ago,
upon taking charge of a student body that seemed interested rather superficially in the sub
jects of study, ['[t]he principal of colored schools at Winston-Salem'] decided to open a
kitchen, a sewing room, and a laundry to fit the girls and boys for employment. A few boys,
and fewer girls, applied. He then required every girl to enter the classes, but the sewing
classes were filled and cooking and laundry classes went begging. The School Board finally
decreed that every girl who failed to give the required amount of time to cooking, sewing,
and laundry, would be dismissed.").
202. See ISABEL BEVIER, HOME ECONOMICS IN EDUCATION 128 (1924); see also id.
("The proceedings of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges for 1922 includes a list of
forty-one such colleges with departments of home economics.").
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partments were usually not formally sex-segregated, but they were de
liberately designed to direct female students toward marriage and ma
ternity and away from the courses that male students attended and the
professional preparation offered there.
Consider the University of Wisconsin, for example. This school be
came formally coeducational in 1874.203 But as the president of the
university, Charles Van Hise, proudly explained in a 1907 address, the
school had nonetheless managed to orchestrate "nearly complete seg
regation on a large scale by the establishment of courses and colleges
which are practically for the one sex or the other."204 In particular,
"[t]he colleges of engineering, law, commerce, agriculture, and medi
cine" were "essentially men's colleges," although officially "open to
women."205 To help accomplish this, the University of Wisconsin, like
the universities of Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio,
Tennessee, and many other states, had established "for the women"
"courses for training the heads of households," "[w]hether such
courses be called home economics, household science, or domestic sci
ence. "206 The director of the Department of Home Economics at the
University of Illinois from 1900 to 1921 similarly reported that her de
partment was designed to guide women away from opportunities that
they might have been tempted to pursue outside the home, "lured by
the promise of greater freedom and larger compensation."207
When coeducational schools were not steering their female stu
dents toward marriage itself, they structured their course offerings to
direct women to a small number of female-dominated jobs familiar
from the curricula of many women's public schools. One 1914 survey,
for instance, found that the high schools in 147 cities offered the fol
lowing classes, clearly intended to occupy female students: "Cooking,

203. See 3 University of Wisconsin, Series No. 1/1/l, Board of Regents Minutes 201-02
(Jan. 21 , 1 874) (on file with author; University of Wisconsin-Madison Archives) ("[T]he
University shall be open to female as well as male students, with no other regulations or re
striction on the part of the Board of Regents, than those that may be deemed necessary and
proper for the preservation of order and discipline.").
204. Van Hise, supra note 195, at 516.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 516-17. Edwin E. Slosson similarly contended that coeducational schools like
the University of Wisconsin should promote what he called "'natural segregation,"' by "pro
viding vocational courses which [will] draw women away from the liberal arts department as
the engineering courses have drawn off the men." Edwin E. Slosson, University of
Wisconsin, 67 INDEP. 8, 22 (1909). "[I]t is clear," Slosson explained, "that the main business
of most women is in household administration and industries." Id.
207. BEVIER, supra note 202, at 221. Lou C. Allen, the first Professor of Domestic
Science at the University of Illinois, see id. at 124-25, described the school's home economics
department this way: "'The school was the outgrowth of a conviction that a rational system
for the higher and better education of women must recognize their distinctive duties as
women-the mothers, housekeepers, and health keepers of the world-and furnish instruc
tion which shall fit them to meet these duties."' Id. at 126 (quoting Allen).
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98; dressmaking, 92; sewing, 89; home economics, 72; millinery, 7 1 ;
nursing, 24; costume designing, 4; dietetics, 1 ; food preparation, 1;
house decoration, 1; laundering, l."208
Yet another strategy, less common but motivated by similar con
cerns, was to establish junior colleges in an effort to keep female stu
dents away from flagship coeducational public universities and the
prestige and professional advancement offered there. For example,
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, the president of the University of California
from 1899 to 1919,209 advised his female students that they were at
school "for the preparation of marriage and motherhood. This educa
tion should tend to make you more serviceable as wives and moth
ers."210 But Wheeler still sought to minimize female enrollment at the
University of California, and accordingly supported the establishment
of junior colleges in the state on the ground that women were "more
likely [than men] to remain at home and attend the junior college. "211
In sum, the historical record reveals that separation is not the only
mechanism through which unequal citizenship can be maintained and
inferiority enforced. Historically, role confinement has been evident in
approximately equal measure in sex-segregated and coeducational
public schools. This suggests that a Court deciding whether sex
segregated public education is inherently incompatible with women's
equality could usefully consider whether sex-segregated public schools
actually deny women "full citizenship stature" and "create or perpetu
ate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women" in a way or to
a degree that coeducational public schools do not.212 It also suggests
that if sex-segregated public education is not completely banned under
Virginia's framework, a Court determining how best to regulate
single-sex public schools so that they do not infringe upon women's
equal status would be well-advised to pay attention to the potential
problem of role confinement. Along the same lines, a Court seeking to
effectively safeguard women's citizenship could wisely focus much
more constitutional scrutiny on coeducational public schools directly,

208. Richmond, supra note 164, at 195-96.

209. See WILLIAM w ARREN FERRIER, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
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considering the possibility that these schools may also need more
stringent constitutional regulation to prevent them from impinging
upon women's equality.
C. Women an d Men A re Not NecessarilyInterchangeab le in
Con siderin g What Denies "Full Citizen ship" an d Maintain s
"Inferiority"
Lastly, the historical record of sex-segregated public education re
veals that women and men are not necessarily interchangeable in con
sidering whether a practice denies "full citizenship" and maintains "in
feriority."213 Virginia seems to express a particular constitutional
concern for women's "full citizenship stature" and "the legal, social,
and economic inferiority of w o men."214 This specific focus on women
appears both in the opinion's language,215 and in the justification that
Virginia offers for its suggested standard: If constitutional law has a
responsibility to safeguard and defend women's equal citizenship be
cause of the law's longstanding role in maintaining and enforcing
women's inequality,216 no historical record would provide the same jus
tification for committing the sex discrimination jurisprudence to the
protection of men's equal citizenship. At the same time, there are por
tions of the Virginia opinion that appear to treat men and women in
terchangeably. Virginia, for instance, makes clear that sex-segregated
public schools must, at a minimum, conform to separate but equal re
quirements. Its application of these requirements to the Virginia
Military Institute, which excluded women, is not noticeably different
from the Hogan Court's application of separate but equal principles to
the Mississippi University for Women, which excluded men.217 Cer
tainly, the sex discrimination jurisprudence before Virginia treats the
constitutional claims of men and women interchangeably. Indeed, the
Court has stressed that point by choosing cases with male plaintiffs for
its announcement of heightened scrutiny (Craig) , and its first opinion
on sex-segregated public education (Hogan).218
The historical record of sex-segregated public education; however,
reveals that what deprives women of equal citizenship may not neces
sarily do the same for men. This is one reason, for instance, that com
pliance with separate but equal standards (which, as we have seen,

213. Id.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See supra text accompanying note 80.
216. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 49, 65-73 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20, 47-49, 52-60.
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may not always be sufficient to protect women's equal status)219 also
may not always be needed to safeguard "full citizenship stature" or
combat "legal, social, and economic inferiority."220 Historically, public
school systems have frequently caused women both material and dig
nitary harm by denying them access tq the opportunities and resources
available in men's public schools.221 But it is not at all clear that men's
exclusion from women's public schools (where men had no access to
the same opportunities and curricula elsewhere) has historically oper
ated to deprive either men or women of "full citizenship stature. "222
This does not tell us whether any particular modern arrangement of
sex-segregated public education that does not. meet separ11te but equal
standards is still consistent with the "full citizenship stature" of womeq
(or men).223 But it does suggest that the importance to be placed on
compliance with separate but equal standards is something that could
be the subject of particularized investigation rather than assumption
even if the Court's firm commitment to separate but eq�al principles .
as a required constitutional minimum indicates that it is unlikely to do
this. More generally, this record suggests that a Court considering
whether, when, why, and how a practice denies equal citizenship
should not simply assume that the answer will be the same for women
and men.
CONCLUSION

Virginia suggests that the constitutional law of sex discrimination
should focus on whether a practice denies women "full citizenship.
stature" or "create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women."224 But the opinion does not tell us how to de
termine which practices meet those criteria. The answer to this ques
tion is hardly obvious or automatic. As this Article's case study of sex
segregated public education suggests, however, a historical record can
usefully inform an inquiry into whether, when, why, and how a par
ticular practice is consistent with women's equal status. Ultimately,
this project of specific application may be at least as important as any
more general constitutional commitment to protecting women's "full
citizenship stature" and combating their "legal, social, and economic

219. See supra text accompanying note 156.
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221. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102, 183-192.
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inferiority."225 Indeed, it may call into question many of the core as
sumptions of the current sex discrimination jurisprudence.

225. Id.

